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Attempts To Liberalize International Trade In Agriculture and
the Problem of the External Aspects of the Common
Agricultural Policy of the European Economic

Community
by J. Kodwo Bentil*
major trading nations of the world have, hitherto, been mostly conT he
cerned with liberalizing international trade within the legal framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),' by
reducing or doing away with tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in industrial or manufactured goods.' In that respect, the world's major trading nations have, over the years, achieved some measure of success. The
same is not true of reduction or removal of barriers to international trade
in agricultural products; such efforts have been lacking in political will
and economic seriousness and have become, legally and practically, inconsequential. Yet, for developed as well as developing countries, agricultural products account for an important part of their exports.3 For
example, in 1983, international trade in agricultural products was worth
$270 billion, which exceeded the value of international trade in motor
vehicles and chemicals that year.4
The recent GATT Tokyo Round declaration that the principles and
codes of conduct, agreed upon by the GATT contracting parties,5 would
be applicable not only to international trade in industrial or manufactured goods, but also to world trade in agricultural products, may not
have been realized. The principal GATT trading nations have not translated the declaration into practice, so far as international trade in agricultural products is concerned. The drafters of the GATT Tokyo Round
* Department of Legal Studies, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia; LL.B.,
LL.M., M. Phil., B. Sc. (Econ.), University of London; Barrister-at-Law of the Lincoln's Inn, England; Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Ghana.
I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,

T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
2 See, e.g., The World Strikes Back, THE ECONOMLST, Aug. 1, 1981, at 45. "In the past, the big
trading areas-the EEC, Japan, the U.S. and Canada-have been more concerned about trade in
manufactures than about agriculture." Id.
3 GATT AcTrivmEs IN 1973, at 30 (1974); GATT AcTlvrrEs IN 1975, at 26 (1976).
4 Bring Free Trade to the Farm, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 24, 1984, at 73.
5 Action by the Contracting Parties on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Nov. 28, 1979,
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFs AND TRADE, BAsIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED

MENTS [hereinafter cited as GATT, BISD] 201 (26th Supp. 1978-79).
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declaration may have assumed that particular conditions would come to
prevail which, in turn, would insure its proper application. Particularly,
it appears to have been assumed that individual national or regional governments would adhere to the principles and codes of conduct agreed
upon at the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations regarding
international trade in agricultural products and that they would leave the
traditional agricultural markets of their trading partners undisturbed.
Despite their apparent desire to liberalize international trade in agricultural products, the GATT's major trading nations have been actuated by
their economic and political self-interest into frustrating proper implementation of the declaration. Not surprisingly, one commentator has recently observed of the situation that the GATT needs "to do something
about swinish behaviour in world markets for agricultural goods," and
that, "[p]rotectionist barriers, subsidies and pork-barrel politics have for
too long stunted trade in farm products." 6
The European Economic Community (EEC) is one of the few major
trading blocs of the world. Consequently, the way and manner in which
it formulates and implements its law and policy regarding farming and
trade in farm products impinges on international trade in agricultural
products. While the EEC can justifiably claim that its record on liberalizing international trade in industrial or manufactured goods is highly
impressive,' its record on liberalizing world trade in agricultural products is less virtuous.8
The establishment and operation of the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has hitherto been treated as economically and politically objectionable by various GATT Contracting Parties. However, in
practice, the objections tend to be rather subdued as long as operation of
the CAP has little or no impact on international trade in agricultural
products of non-EEC countries. One apt observation of the situation is
that "[t]he rest of the world agreed not to challenge the community's
agricultural policy during the GATT Tokyo Round, but only so long as
the EEC did not use export subsidies to expand beyond its existing markets."9 Unfortunately, events have taken such a turn that the EEC's
CAP has undermined the international agricultural trade of various nonEEC countries by a significant poaching of their traditional overseas
markets.10 This has given rise to numerous trade disputes between the
6 Bring Free Trade to the Farm, supra note 4.
7 "During the Tokyo Round of GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the EEC reduced the
weighted average of its tariff for finished manufactures, for example, to 6.9 percent, compared with
8.3 percent for Canada and 5.7 percent for the United States." The World Strikes Back, supra note
2, at 45.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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EEC and some of its major trading partners. In some instances, the
EEC's major trading partners have sought or threatened to take retaliatory trade measures against the EEC. The economic uncertainty and instability which this state of affairs has generated in international trade
relations cannot be ignored.
This article examines some of the essential aspects of the problem of
the EEC's CAP against the general background of the efforts of the
world's trading nations to liberalize international trade in agricultural
products. At the outset, it is appropriate to pay some attention to various background events and factors relating to international efforts to liberalize world trade in agricultural products. The various efforts to
liberalize such trade within the general legal framework of the GATT
will be considered and the viability and the likely impact of the relevant
envisaged corrective measures will be examined and assessed.
I

General Background Considerationsand Factors

Unique characteristics of trade in agriculture, not present in the
manufacturing industry, create problems for nations and groups of nations globally. Individual government intervention to protect a country's
agricultural sector from alleged or perceived foreign encroachment is a
common practice and has long been a normal feature of economic and
social policies in, for example, North America, Europe and Australia.'1
The policy has presented particular problems of inequity in GATT to
those countries, both developed and developing, for which agriculture is
an important source of income. 2
Individual government subsidies to farmers result in high prices for
agricultural products, well above world market levels, and in order to
maintain these prices the governments must resort to price controls or
restrictions on imports. 3 The subsidies often lead to surpluses of agricultural products, which are then marketed abroad, creating an economic disadvantage for efficient agriculture producing countries.' 4
In light of the continued intervention in agriculture by individual
governments, it is not surprising that the liberalization of world trade in
agriculture is slow in coming and lags behind that of the industrial sector. Only in the last two of the major rounds of GATT multilateral trade
11 See, eg., Castle, International Policy on Agricultural Trade: A Proposalfor Butter, 4 J. COM-

MON MKT. STUD. 47,49 (1965); Dam, The European Common Market in Agriculture, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 209 (1967).
12 GATT ACTIvrrIEs IN 1967/68, at 11 (1969). See also GATT ACrVITIs IN 1969/70, at 17
(1970); GATT AcTVIrlES IN 1970/71, at 16 (1972); GATT ACTIVrrIES IN 1972, at 15 (1973);
GATT Acnvmms IN 1973, at 30-32 (1974); GA"T AcTIvITIEs IN 1974, at 24-26 (1975); GATr
AcTIvrIEs IN 1976, at 22-23 (1977); GATT AcTIvITES IN 1977, at 23-24 (1978).
13 GATT AcTIvrTIas IN 1969/70, supra note 12, at 17
14 Id.
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negotiations,15 the Kennedy Round, and the Tokyo Round, has any sig-

nificant attention been given to the liberalization of world trade in agricultural products.
A.

The Kennedy Round and the Problem of Barriersto International
Trade in AgriculturalProducts

While the four principal GATT multilateral trade negotiations preceding the Dillon Round of 1960-61 barely touched upon the problem of

barriers to international trade in agricultural products,16 the Dillon

Round did direct attention to the problem. 7 Although no concrete results were reached at the Dillon Round, it did become apparent that the
issue could not be ignored at subsequent GATT Rounds and as a result,
it was highlighted at the Kennedy Round. Some tangible results materialized during the Kennedy Round, towards the liberalization of world
trade in agriculture. However, they did not match the successful results
in the industrial sector," despite the fact that the United States in particular emphasized the importance of the reduction of barriers to trade in
agriculture. 19
Theoretically, the same rules and procedures of the GATT are ap-

plicable to the regulation of international trade in agricultural products

and manufactured goods.2" In practice, these rules and procedures are
often waived in regulating trade in agricultural products.2 1 Unlike the
regulation of trade in manufactured goods, the escape clauses in the
GATT which allow individual governments in certain circumstances to
act in derogation of the rules and procedures, are more easily applied to

international trade in agricultural products. 2

1 The tariff negotiating conferences held in Geneva, Switzerland in 1947, in Annecy, France in
1949, in Torquay, England in 1951, in Geneva in 1956, and 1960 and 1961 (the Dillon Round, and
during 1964-67 (the Kennedy Round), and 1973-79 (the Tokyo Round).
16 However, the GATT followed the example of the Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO) of the United Nations in 1955, when it formulated procedures by which governments of the
GATT trading nations could notify and consult one another on disposal of surpluses of agricultural
products likely to undermine world trade in such products. The idea behind this was to avoid disruption of world agricultural markets which the disposal of those surpluses tended to cause. See
GATT ACTIvrTIES IN 1969/70, supra note 12, at 20.
17 See Free Trade for Farmers, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1982, at 18; Bring Free Trade to the
Farm, supra note 4.
18 See The Kennedy Round, 1 J. WORLD TRADE L. 475, 476 (1967).

19 Dam, supra note 11, at 256.
20 See, e-g., Bring Free Trade to the Farm, supra note 4.
21 Id
22 GATT AcTivmas IN 1969/70, supra note 12, at 18: "For agricultural and fisheries products, unlike industrial goods, the [GATT] does not prohibit import restrictions where these are
necessary to enforce a government programme that limits the marketing or production of domestic
products." Id.
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The GATT Trade Negotiations Committee23 stated that the Kennedy Round "should provide for acceptable conditions of access to world

markets for agricultural products in furtherance of a significant develop-

ment and expansion of world trade in such products."'2 4 In pursuit of its
objective, on March 18, 1965 the Trade Negotiations Committee adopted
negotiation procedures2 5 which had been formulated by the committee
on Agriculture.2 6 Pursuant to the adopted procedure, the trade negotiations were to proceed on the basis of specific offers on trade in individual
agricultural products.27
Regarding international trade barriers, the agreements finally
reached, particularly those concerning the exports of the less developed
Third World countries, only established general guidelines and positions
for future GATT trade negotiations.2 8 From the general standpoint of
the need to reduce or remove barriers to international trade in agricultural products, the Kennedy Round trade negotiations turned out to be
very disappointing.29 Hardly any agreement was reached on the funda-

conditions of access to world markets for agrimental issue of acceptable
30
cultural commodities."
However, agreements were reached on two main matters incidental

to the conduct of international trade in grains. First, it was agreed that,
in a future international wheat agreement, the minimum and the maxi23 The Trade Negotiations Committee was composed of the leading representatives of all the
countries which had expressed an intention to participate in the Kennedy Round. That Committee
was charged with supervising the conduct of the Kennedy Round multilateral trade negotiations.
24 THE AcnvrxEs oF GATT 1964/65, at 19 (1965). This pious projection was appropriately
described by a leading international economist as "a vague phrase indicating the intention to impose
some sort of rules on what has frequently been the equivalent ofjungle warfare." See The Kennedy
Round, supra note 18, at 476-77.
25 THE AcrivnrEs oF GATT 1964/65, supra note 24, at 19.
26 IidThe Committee on Agriculture was established by the Trade Negotiations Committee in
June, 1963.
27 Id.

28 See, e-g., The Kennedy Round, supra note 18, at 475.
29 For a similar assessment, see, eg., Wheeler, GovernmentalIntervention in World Trade in
Wheat, 1 J.WoRLD TRADE L. 379, 395 (1967); The Kennedy Round, supra note 18, at 478.
30 Note, however, that some decisions were adopted for the purpose of reducing tariffs on a few
agricultural or quasi-agricultural products, such as canned fruit, wine, whisky, hops and tobacco.
Even then, the tariff reductions were hardly significant and had a minimal effect on stimulating
international trade in the agricultural products involved. Wheeler, supra note 29, at 395. See also K.
RYAN,INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 34-35 (1975).
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mum price should be increased by about 12 percent. 3 1 The idea behind
this was to ensure that prices for wheat and wheat flour remained stable
in the international market and that the incomes of wheat producers
would become more realistic and viable. Secondly, an agreement was
reached providing for 4.5 million metric tons of grain to be distributed
annually over a three year period as food aid for the Third World Countries.32 Apart from the agreements reached on grains, attention was also
directed to international trade in meat. Yet the best that was achieved as
to meat was the mere conclusion of various bilateral agreements between
some of the GATT Contracting Parties.33
Despite the recalcitrant attitudes of certain major GATT Contracting Parties, the EEC appears to have been most to blame for the
failure of the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations concerning effective and adequate tackling of the problem of barriers to international trade in agricultural products. 34 First, the EEC was in the process
of establishing its CAP and therefore was unwilling to accept substantial
reductions in its level of agricultural trade protection. Secondly, the
EEC felt that negotiations needed to be aimed at the gradual reduction of
"the total" government support to the agricultural sector, particularly
31 Wheeler, supra note 29, at 395.
32 In this context, participating countries were committed to contributing wheat and coarse
grains, or the cash equivalent thereof, as aid to the Third World developing countries. The United
States was committed to contribute 42%, Canada to 11%, the EEC to 23%, Australia to 5%, the
United Kingdom to 5%, Japan to 5%, Sweden to 1.2%, Switzerland to 0.7%, Denmark to 0.6%,
Argentina to 0.5%, Finland to 0.3%, and Norway to 0.3% of the total amount fixed. REVIEW OF
THE WORLD WHEAT SITUATION 1966/67, at 69 (1967).
The provisions governing the agreement, which were incorporated into the International Grains
Arrangement of 1967, were negotiated under the auspices of the International Wheat Council. The
International Grains Arrangement was established following the International Wheat Conference
held in Rome from July 12 to August 18, 1967. The conference was attended by 53 countries and
the EEC. The Arrangement adopted consisted of two separate legal instruments: The Wheat Trade
Convention, which dealt with the stabilzation of the international market for wheat and wheat flour,
and the Food Aid Convention. Both legal instruments came into effect by July 1, 1968. The separate Wheat Trade Convention constituted a natural successor to the long line of International Wheat
Agreements concluded since 1949. See REVIEW OF THE WORLD WHEAT SITUATION 1966/67,

supra, at 64-65.
The International Wheat Council is an independent international commodity trade regulatory
body established by the International Wheat Agreement of 1949, as subsequently retained under
respective renegotiated International Wheat Agreements. It consists of the representatives of countries that are significant exporters and importers of wheat and wheat flour. It has its headquarters in
London and is responsible for ensuring a stabilization of prices for wheat and wheat flour in international trade and for assuring supplies of such products to importing countries and markets.
The food aid agreement rationalized the much bemoaned practice of disposing of grain surpluses in international markets and was to spread the cost of the aid among the developed market
economies. The Kennedy Round, supra note 18, at 478. See also M. VAN MEERHAEGHE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 102 (2d ed. 1971).

33 The Kennedy Round, supra note 18, at 478.
34 See, e.g., M. VAN MEERHAEGHE, supra note 32, at 101.
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regarding barriers to imports and other forms of support such as
subsidies. a5
Despite its failure to resolve fairly and adequately the essential problem of barriers to international trade in agricultural products, the Kennedy Round prepared the way for more serious and propitious
consideration of the problem at the next major GATT multilateral trade
negotiations.3 6 From a purely legal and procedural standpoint, the Kennedy Round had established some basic trade negotiation rules and
mechanisms which would be pressed into service during the next major
GATT round. However, recourse to such expertise was not bound to
guarantee success with respect to the negotiation of substantive international agricultural trade issues.
B.

The Tokyo Round Negotiations and the Problem of Barriers to
World Trade in AgriculturalProducts

Unlike any previous major GATT round of multilateral trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round negotiations dwelt, at considerable length on
the problem of barriers to international trade in agricultural products.
Consequently, it merits more thorough examination and evaluation. It is
necessary to divide the examination into three main parts, namely: 1)
developments from 1967 to 1973 before the actual Tokyo Round negotiations; 2) the Tokyo Declaration and subsequent trade negotiations regarding the agricultural sector; and 3) results of the Tokyo Round in
relation to the agricultural sector.
1. Developments from 1967 to 1973 Before the Actual Tokyo
Round Negotiations
After the Kennedy Round it became apparent that GATT had to do
more in the area of barriers to agricultural trade. As part of a long term
plan, it looked at the fundamental problems concerning agricultural
trade and began to plan the bringing about of better conditions which
would lead to commercial competition in farm product markets. 37 To
this end, in 1967 the GATT's Agriculture Committee was
charged with
38
establishing a program to tackle these barrier problems.
By 1968 the Agriculture Committee had completed its documentation of the issues.39 It began studying the structure of actual markets and
the production policies of each nation.' More specifically, the Commit35 Id.

36 The Kennedy Round, supra note 18, at 479-80.
37 GATT AcTivrriEs IN 1967/68, supra note 12, at 11.
38 Id.
39 Id at 12.

4 Id.
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tee studied measures affecting exports of farm products, imports of farm
products, and details of national policies for agricultural production.4"
By 1969 the Committee was in a position to begin looking at solutions in
each area.42 To this end, the GATT Secretariat, in a move that received
much support, made a plea for national discipline in controlling agricultural production and cooperation with other countries.4 3
Consequently, as a prelude to the envisaged major GATT negotiations, four main categories of negotiation techniques and modalities were
examined.' First, specific measures covering the reduction, relaxation
or elimination of certain identified types of barriers to international agricultural trade were examined.4" In that regard, attention was given to
the impact of export aids, tariffs, variable levies, quantitative restrictions,
and health and sanitary regulations.4 6 Second, attention was given to a
general measures approach through which measures could be devised for
alleviating some of the problems of international agricultural markets
and through which codes of good conduct could be examined.47 Third,
common criteria for the assessment of commitments assumed by GATT
Contracting Parties with respect to the agricultural sector were considered. Fourth, a combination of techniques by which the disadvantages of
one technique could be offset by the advantages of another were examined.48 As a result, various proposals were formulated.
Obviously, the preparatory work of the Agriculture Committee
tended to be concentrated on barriers to international trade in temperate
agricultural products. Yet barriers to international trade in tropical agricultural products were of great concern to the Third World countries.
Fortunately, the latter problem came to receive equal attention, although
on a separate basis. Thus, in the GATT Preparatory Committee and
GATT Ministerial meeting it was agreed that in the foreshadowed major
GATT multilateral trade negotiations, timely attention must be given to
problems in international trade in tropical agricultural products in raw,
semi-processed and processed forms.4 9 To that end, studies were done to
provide the participants in the trade negotiations with statistical data and
analytical documentation regarding international trade in coffee, cocoa,
tea, bananas, pepper, vegetable oils, and other products.5" Thus, a clear
41 Dairy products, cereals, meat, vegetables, fruit, vegetable oils and oil seeds, raw tobacco, and
wine. See GATT AcrxvmEs IN 1969/70, supra note 12, at 19.
42 Id.
43 Id.

44 GATr AcTrvrriEs IN 1972, supra note 12, at 17.
45 Id.

46Id.
47 Id.

48 Id.at 17-18.
49 GATT AcTsvmEs IN 1973, supra note 3, at 34.
50 Id.
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picture emerged of the existing trade flows on a most favored nation and
on a preferential basis, as well as of the relevant tariff and non-tariff
measures applied in developed market economies, regarding those
products.5 1
2. The Tokyo Declaration and Subsequent Trade Negotiations Regarding the Agricultural Sector
The Kennedy Round had failed to address the removal of agricultural trade barriers, resulting in continuation of the existing trade
problems.5 2 The topic of barrier removal became of great concern to the
farming nations contracting under GATT.5 3 Therefore, international
trade in farm products was one of the specific negotiation topics under
the Tokyo Declaration.5 4
The negotiations faced the complex problem of stabilizing prices
and markets while also guaranteeing regular and adequate supplies. Adding to the problem was a background of conflicting signals from the
markets themselves. From the 1950s through the 1970s there had been a
surplus of farm products 55 due to technological innovations and the interventionist policies of governments.5 6 This gave rise to the "accumulation of costly stocks. . . closing-off of markets, and price wars in the
decreasing number of those that remained open."51 7 The supply of farm
products outstripped demand. Yet, due to deliberate government programs limiting farm output, demand had outstripped supply by the mid
to late 1970s.58 This situation was made worse by many unexpected
crop failures.5 9
The negotiators also had the concerns of each contracting party to
consider. They were urged to "take into account special problems of the
farm sector."' Agriculture was of great importance to the Third World
countries and special deference was given them and their major export,
tropical farm products. 6 1 A special subgroup of the Trade Negotiations
Committee was set up to look into the problems concerning tropical farm
Id
GATT AcrivmES IN 1974, supra note 12, at 24.
See id at 24-25.
GATT AcTvrTIES IN 1975, supra note 3, at 26.
GATT AcTIVrrIEs IN 1974, supra note 12, at 25.
56 IJd
57 Id
58 Id. at 26.
51

52
53
54
55

59

Id.

60 GATT AcnvmEs IN 1976, supra note 12, at 22.
61 GATT Ac'nvrrms N 1974, supra note 12, at 27. See also GATT AcnvrriEs IN 1975,
supra note 3, at 32; GATT AcTivmEs IN 1976, supra note 12, at 30; GATT Acmvrcmss IN 1977,
supra note 12, at 30.
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products.6 2
There was also the problem of dealing with the larger, more developed countries. Being the two largest participants, any disagreement between the EEC and the United States would be a major stumbling block.
For example, the United States wanted to negotiate farm and manufactured goods together. The EEC felt negotiations on farm products
needed their own rules and mechanisms. 63 The United States also
wanted to alter the EEC's policy of subsidized exports and variable tariffs
on imports." In 1977 the two sides agreed that farm negotiations would
be conducted separately, but would proceed parallel to other negotiations
concerning manufactured goods.6 5
The rules and measures being devised for reducing barriers to international trade in both manufactured and agricultural goods were expected to be capable of altering, supplementing or strengthening, within
the legal framework of the GATT, those rules already established.6 6 It is
therefore necessary to outline the essential features of the negotiations
concerning international trade in specific agricultural products.
The Tokyo Round multilateral trade negotiations sought to address
not only the rules and measures necessary for reducing or eliminating
various tariff barriers, but also those required for controlling non-tariff
barriers. The negotiations on tariff cuts on industrial imports were aimed
6
The same could hardly be said of the
at a targeted level of reductionY.
negotiations over tariff cuts on farm product imports. Arguably, the dismantling of tariff barriers on imported farm products may have been
thought of as warranting only gradual and modest implementation. The
habit of individual governments to grant export subsidies in order to ensure their own economic protection is common knowledge. The distorting effect of this measure on international trade cannot be denied.
Although the applicable provisions of the GATT were supposed to prevent or control the practice,68 the efficacy of these provisions became
doubtful. The same could be said of the provisions of the GATT which
imposition of countervailing duties in respect of subsidized
regulate 6 the
9
imports.

Consequently, the Tokyo Round focused attention on rules and pro62 See, eg., GATT AcTIvrriEs IN 1974, supra note 12, at 28.
63 InformationalReport of the Committee on InternationalEconomic Organizations,11I NT'L
LAW. 211, 213 (1977).

64 Id.
65 GATT Acrnvrs IN 1977, supra note 12, at 24.
66 GAIT AcTInvmS IN 1980, at 5 (1981).
67 A reduction of about one-third of that which was achieved in the Kennedy Round of GATT
multilateral trade negotiations.
68 GATT, supra note 1, at A51, T.I.A.S. No. 1700. at 47, 55 U.N.T.S. at 250 (art. XVI).
69 Id. at A23, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 19, 55 U.N.T.S. at 212 (art. VI).
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cedures needed to buttress the applicable provisions of the GATT.70 The
area of subsidies and countervailing duties are governed by separate provisions of the GAT. However, the two are linked in practice because
countervailing duties are applied to offset subsidies. 7 1 The area of subsidies and countervailing duties was recognized as one of the most difficult
among the various areas of multilateral trade negotiations and it was also
recognized as one of the most important in the Tokyo Round negotiations. 72 Therefore, not surprisingly, efforts made by the negotiators in
1977 to reach agreement on a negotiating framework failed to materialize. Moreover, by the beginning of 1978, the parties had yet to agree
upon a document that could serve as a basis for negotiating on the two
related subjects.73
The industrialized countries sought to emphasize negotiations to
limit subsidies of farm products. 74 The Third World was also interested
in these negotiations. 75 They had found subsidies a necessary evil to protect their infant industries. Towards this end, they advanced a proposal
concerning more explicit rules on subsidies and countervailing duties.76
Regarding technical barriers to trade, the applicable provisions of
the GATT regulating the practices involved 77 were not adequate. The
need for greater international discipline of such practices became widely
recognized. 7 8 Consequently, the negotiating countries began to examine
a Draft Code of Conduct for Preventing Technical Barriers to Trade,
which set out rules on the application of technical standards in international trade. 79 The Third World countries became particularly active in
this area, seeking provisions in the Draft Code that would meet their
special needs."
Legitimate recourse to import licensing procedures was acknowledged, but their inappropriate formulation and enforcement was considered an obstacle to proper conduct of international trade. Consequently,
the negotiating countries set about seeking ways and means of ensuring
simplification of such procedures, and of ensuring their administration in
a rather neutral and fair manner.
The provisions of the GATT applicable to customs valuation had
70 Most industrialized countries suggested a code or interpretative note to supplement the relevant GATT provisions. See GATT AcTIvmrEs IN 1976, supra note 12, at 20.
71 Id. at 20; See also GAT Acnvrnas IN 1977, supra note 12, at 21.
72 GAIT AcTIvrriEs IN 1977, supra note 12, at 21.
73 Id.
74 Id.

75
76
77
78
79
80

GATT AcTIviTIEs IN 1976, supra note 12, at 21.

Id.
GATT, supra note 1, at A28, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 24, 55 U.N.T.S. at 218 (art. VIII).
GATT AcTivrrEs IN 1976, supra note 12, at 18.
GATT ACTIIvrIEs IN 1977, supra note 12, at 19.
Id.
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sought to bring some order into its operation, 81 yet this was not entirely
successful and the need for stronger applicable GATT provisions became
apparent. Consequently, the Tokyo Round negotiations directed attention to the need for common international rules82 as a means of avoiding
disparities or inconsistencies between different government systems. The
negotiations on the subject became more concrete in November, 1977,
when the EEC submitted a draft customs valuation code. 83 Subsequently, the draft code was accepted by most of the negotiating countries
as a basis for future work on the subject.84
As a result of the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations
of 1964-67, a general GATT Anti-Dumping Code had been adopted.85
Dumping is the practice by which "products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country, at less than the normal
value of the products."8 6 It is of special concern where the practice
causes or threatens to cause material injury to an established industry in
an importing country or materially militates against the establishment of
a domestic industry in an importing country. Any measure for countering the practice becomes an anti-dumping one. The GATT AntiDumping Code, adopted at the end of the Kennedy Round negotiations,
contained various discrepancies and needed revising." The Tokyo
Round negotiations set about the necessary revision. In particular, it was
imperative that any revised version of that Code be brought into line with
any forthcoming GATT regime for the regulation of subsidies and countervailing duties.88 Mainly this would prevent apparent or likely inconsistencies in the application of the provisions of the new GATT regime
and those of a revised GATT Anti-Dumping Code. The special position
of the Third World developing countries was taken into account by the
Tokyo Round negotiators.
3. Results of the Tokyo Round in Relation to the Agricultural
Sector
The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations was concluded
81 GATT, supra note 1, at A25, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 21, 55 U.N.T.S. at 216 (art. VII).

82 GATT AcrIvnmEs IN 1976, supra note 12, at 20; GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1977, supranote 12,
at 19-20.
83 GATT AcTVrriEs IN 1977, supra note 12, at 19.
84 Id. at 19-20. while some major trading nations already had customs valuation based on the
so-called Brussels Definition of Value, others failed to follow suit. Id at 20. There were also important differences of view and practice between some of those trading nations. Id.
85 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, June 30, 1979, 19 U.S.T 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431, 651 U.N.T.S. 320 [hereinafter cited as the
GATT Anti-Dumping Code].
86 Id.
87 GATT AcTvrrzas IN 1973, supra note 12, at 42.
88 GAIT ACTIVirEs IN 1979, at 25 (1980).
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in November, 1979.89 Agreements were reached for an improved legal
framework for the conduct of world trade, on tariff cuts 90 and on the
regulation of non-tariff barriers to international trade. Regarding the
agreements on regulation of non-tariff barriers, the following must be
noted: Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade;9 1 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
GATT:92 Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 93
with an Accompanying Protocol; 94 Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; 95 and Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT.9 6 All of the agreements adopted regarding both tariff and nontariff barriers "apply to world trade in farm products, as well as to industrial products." 97 Incorporated into all of the agreements reached were
provisions ensuring special and more favorable treatment for the Third
World countries.9 8
At the same time, two other agreements were reached, relating to
the regulation of international trade in specific agricultural products.
These were the Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat9 9 and the International Dairy Arrangement" ° (the latter was accompanied by a Protocol
Regarding Certain Milk Powders' 01 and a Protocol Regarding Milk
Fat).1 2 Furthermore, specific agreements were reached between individual developed market economies and the Third World countries as to
grants of trade concessions and contributions regarding world trade in
tropical farm products."0 3 Most of the agreements covering the latter
were reached even before the Tokyo Round negotiations were concluded." ° Thus, trade concessions and contributions regarding tropical
89 GATT AcTvlEs IN 1980, supra note 66, at 8.
90 Geneva (1979) Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, BISD 3
(26th Supp. 1978-79); Protocol Supplementary to the Geneva (1979) Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, BISD 5 (26th Supp. 1978-79).
91 GAT, BISD 8 (26th Supp. 1978-.79).
92 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, 18 I.L.M.
579 [hereinafter cited as the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties].
93 GAT, BISD 116 (26th Supp. 1978-79). This is the Code on Customs Valuation.
94 Protocol to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, GATT, BISD 151 (26th Supp. 1978-79).
95 Id. at 154.
96 GAT Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 85.
97

GATT ACnvrrEs

IN

1978, at 43 (1979); GAT AcTIvmEs IN 1979, supra note 88, at 27.

See, eg., Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, supra note 92, at art. 14.
99 GAT, BISD 84 (26th Supp. 1978-79).
100 Id. at 91.
101 Id. at 101.
9S

102 Id. at 107.
103 GAT ACTIvmES IN 1978, supra note 97, at 49-50.
104 GAT Acrivrms IN 1976, supra note 12, at 29-33.
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farm products to developed countries, already promised by Australia, the
EEC, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, became
effective in early January, 1977.1"5 Additionally, Canada and Japan gave
effect to their concessions and contributions from the beginning of April,
1977, while Austria followed suit in July, 1977.106 The United States
offered concessions on a most favored nation (MFN) basis regarding various tropical farm products. 107 In this latter context, consultations were
geared to implementing the offers began in 1976 between the United
States and interested developing countries. Consultations continued in
1977 while, at the same time, the United States signed an agreement with
Mexico. 0 8
No doubt the results of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations regarding the liberalization of world trade in both industrial
goods and agricultural products were, on paper, very impressive. The
Commission of the European Communities (EC Commission), in its report to the Council of the European Communities (EC Council), concerning the overall results of the Tokyo Round, regarded such results as
"both substantial and balanced" from the standpoint of the EEC.10 9 In
particular, on the Tokyo Round's results regarding the liberalization of
world trade in agricultural products, the EC Commission had occasion
to observe:
Substantial progress has also been made in ensuring greater stability
and better market opportunities for agricultural products and in ending the warfare which has raged intermittently over the last two decades over the implications for world trade of the [EEC's] common
agricultural policy. The agreement reached and the general consultative mechanism to be set up will substantially contribute to the stability of world markets while avoiding any threat to the principles
and
0
mechanism of the [EEC's] common agricultural policy."
Yet, this has not been particularly borne out since the various agreements adopted at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of multilateral negotiations have come into force. While the binding legal character of the
instruments incorporating the agreements is not controverted, the actual
implementation of the agreements themselves, regarding the liberalization of world trade in agricultural products, can hardly be said to have
been substantial or impressive. Consequently, the efficacy of the agreements is questionable. Perhaps the comprehensive and complex charac105
106
107
note 12,
108
109
110

Id. at 29-30; GATT AcrivrnEs IN 1977, supra note 12, at 29.
GATT AcTnvmEs IN 1977, supra note 12, at 29.
See GATT ACrIvrrlEs IN 1976, supra note 12, at 33; GATT AcTivrrEs IN 1977, supra
at 29.
See GATT AcTivmEs IN 1977, supra note 12, at 29.
Tokyo Round: Substantialand BalancedResults, 12 BULL. EUR. CoMM. 7 (No. 10 1979).
Id. at 8.
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ter of such agreements accounted for this state of affairs. Reference is
made to the following pertinent observation of the secretariat of the
GAIT: "While the results of the previous six rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations in GATT were largely 'self-executing' in that they
mostly concerned automatic, phased tariff cuts, implementation of the
Tokyo Round agreements-covering a much broader and more complex
field-will require permanent monitoring, interpretation and
negotiation."1'1 1
C. Legal Status and Force of GA TT Provisionsand Agreed Measures
vis-d-vis the EEC
As a multilateral treaty, the GATT is legally binding on the Contracting Parties. Equally, obligations assumed under GATT and measures established in pursuance of its objectives and principles have binding
legal force on the Contracting Parties and are, therefore, to be implemented by the respective governments. The individual Member States of
the EEC were original Contracting Parties to the GATT and, therefore,
bound by the provisions of and obligations imposed by the GATT and its
related legal instruments. However, the subsequent establishment and
operation of the European Common Market changed all that. The EEC
replaced it's individual Member States in relation to the observance of
the provisions, of and the commitments under, the GATT. After all, the
treaty establishing the EEC. 2 (Treaty of Rome) has endowed it with a
legal personality. 1 3 The Treaty of Rome empowered the competent authorities of the EEC to base the EEC's common commercial policy on
uniform principles, particularly regarding changes in tariff rates, tariff
and trade agreements, achievement of uniformity in measures of trade
liberalization, export policy, and measures for protecting trade, such as
those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies."'
In the earlier EEC joined cases of InternationalFruit Co. N. V and
Others v. Produktschapvoor Groenten en Fruit (No.3),"5 the EC Court
clarified the position of the EEC in terms of the GATT. The EC Court
stressed that substitution of the EEC for its individual Member States
regarding commitments under the GATT took place on July 1, 1968,
following the introduction of the Common Customs Tariff. This has
111 See GATT AcTivES IN 1980, supra note 66, at 8.
112 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
113 Id. at 86 (art. 210).
114 Id. at 60 (art. 113). This also provides for recommendations to be made by the EC Commission to the EC Council, so that the latter may authorize the former to open any necessary commercial negotiations, when agreements with non-EEC countries on trade matters need to be
negotiated.
11'1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1.
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been affirmed by the EC Court in the more recent EEC joined cases of
Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v. SPI and SAMI, 116 which
was referred to the EC Court for a preliminary ruling by the Corte
Suprema di Casazione of Italy. In the latter joined cases, the EC Court
proceeded to indicate how important it was for the GATT provisions of
all arrangements binding on the EEC to receive uniform application
throughout the Member States of the EEC. 117 The EC Court pointed out
that the GATT Protocols of 1962 and 1967, following the Dillon and the
Kennedy Rounds of GATT multilateral trade negotiations, respectively,
were acts of the institution of the EEC and, therefore, could be ruled
upon 1by
the EC Court vis 'a vis the individual Member States of the
18
EEC.

Obviously, the rulings of the EC Court in the foregoing joined cases
apply with equal force to the agreements and measures adopted at the
end of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Apart from
such rulings of the EC Court, there is secondary EEC legislation which
treats the Tokyo Round agreements and measures as legally binding on
the EEC and its Member States. Thus, by a Decision1 19 of the EC Council of December 10, 1979, Concerning the Conclusion of the Multilateral
12 the
Agreements Resulting from the 1973 to 1979 Trade Negotiations,"
Geneva (1979) Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade,' 2 1 the Protocol Supplementary to the Geneva (1979) Protocol to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,12 2 and the various other
agreements reached at the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations were approved on behalf of the EEC.

II.

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF THE EEC's CAP AND
THE CONDUCT OF WORLD TRADE IN FARM PRODUCTS

Politically and technically, the conception and the establishment of
123
the EEC's CAP was an admirable exercise of skill and diplomacy.
Yet, it has been the most difficult and controversial economic regime of
the EEC to operate, especially in view of the often conflicting interests of
116 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 801, 39 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 354.
117 Id. at 828, 39 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 377.
118 Iad at 829, 39 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 378-79.
119 Under Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome, a decision of either the EC Council or the EC
Commission has binding legal force vis-a-vis those to whom it is addressed. Treaty of Rome, supra
note 112, 298 U.N.T.S. at 227.
120 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 71) 1 (1980).
121

GATr, BISD 3 (26th Supp. 1978-79).
5.
Dam, supra note 11, at 264.

122 Id. at
123
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the individual Member States.12 4 The observation has been aptly made:
The common agricultural policy (CAP) is Europe's proudest achievement, and its prodigal son. By boosting output too successfully, it has
generated surpluses that are costly to store and dump and that make
the EEC's trading partners livid. And now it infuriates farmers
125 too, by
not propping up their incomes as much as they would like.
The operation of the CAP has drawn a great deal of criticism and hostility not only from non-EEC countries, but also from some of the individual Member States of the EEC itself.
Although foreign resentment of, or antagonism towards, the operation of the CAP in its initial stages may have been restrained, this is no
longer the case. This observation has been made of the U.S. attitude
towards the situation: "The Americans once viewed Europe's common
agricultural policy. . . with scornful detachment. The EEC was free to
waste money on whatever it liked, the argument ran, so long as it did not
hurt American
interests in the process. But America is no longer a
' 126
bystander."
The need for some drastic changes in the CAP and its operation
could not be denied. The EC Commission itself has maintained that
"[t]wenty years after the common agricultural policy was set up, there is
an objective need for reform."' 127 Despite various proposals submitted by
the EC Commission to the EC Council for a radical reform of the
CAP, 128 no proposals have yet been adopted and given legal force. Consequently, the CAP continues to operate in virtually its original form,
albeit with some de facto changes in its budget operation relating to activities concerning two EEC farm product sectors.29 It is, therefore, an
unreformed CAP which is examined here. The examination is divided
into three parts: noteworthy legal features and essential objective of the
CAP, the CAP's operation in relation to the development of the Euro124 See D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNTmES 324 (3d ed. 1982).
125 Down on the Farm, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1982, at 52.
126 See Europe'sFarmyardFollies, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 1982, at 16.
127 See Rationalization of the Common Agricultural Policy: the Commission's Proposals, 16
BULL. EUR. COMM. 7 (No. 7/8 1983).
128 See, eg., Guidelinesfor EuropeanAgriculture, BULL. EUR. COMM. 63 (Supp. 4 1981); AgriculturalPrices and Related Measuresfor 1984/85: Commission Proposals, 17 BUrt. EUR. COMM. 7
(No. 1 1984); Review of the Common Agricultural Policy and Adoption of Agricultural Pricesfor
1984/85, 17 BULL. EUR. COMM. 10 (No. 3 1984); see also Rationalizationof the Common Agricultural12Policy:
The Commission's Proposals,supra note 127, at 7.
9
Unlimited price guarantees are becoming a thing of the past. European farmers are
beginning to pay part of the cost of disposing of their surpluses by accepting lower prices
for their excess production. This has been the case for sugar for some time, and more
recently and to a limited extent, for dairy products. The principle may soon be applied to
cereals.

The Next Transatlantic War, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1982, at 33.
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pean Common Market, and the operation of the CAP and its impact on
world trade in farm products.
A.

Noteworthy Legal Features and Essential Objectives of the CAP

The economic and social importance of agriculture to the individual
Member States of the EEC is such that the founders of the EEC could
not have left it out of the general scheme of the projected move towards
European integration. 3 ' The Treaty of Rome extended the functioning
of the European Common Market to embrace agriculture and trade in
Products of the soil, stockfarming, and fisheragricultural products.'
ies, both in their raw states and first stages of processing, are subsumed
'
The drafters of
under the general heading of "agricultural products."132
the EEC Treaty realized that, from the beginning, the operation and development of the common market for agricultural products must be accompanied by the establishment of the CAP.'3 3 The CAP would then be
superimposed on the national agricultural policies of the individual
Member States of the EEC. In other words, the individual Member
States of the EEC would no longer operate their own separate national
agricultural policies that would conflict with or derogate from the CAP.
Consequently, the general principle of the primacy of EEC laws and
measures over those of the individual Member States of the EEC has
been applied regarding the operation of the CAP.'
The primacy of EEC law has been underlined by the EC Court in
various cases. In the earlier EEC cases of, for example, Hauptzollamt
Hamburg-Oberelbe v. Firma Paul G. Bollmann,'3 5 and Hauptzollamt
Bremen-Freihafen v. Waren-Import-GesellschaftKrohn & Co., 3 6 as well
as in the more recent EEC joined cases of Procureurdu Roi v. Charles
Kefer and Louis Delmelle,"I the EC Court did not hesitate to highlight
the significance of the primacy of EEC law. The EC Court pointed out
that, to the extent that the Member States of the EEC had assigned legislative powers in tariff matters to the EEC, to ensure the proper operation
of the common agricultural market, they no longer had the power to
130 See, e-g., P. KAPTEYN & P. VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 315-16 (1973); D. LAsOCK & J.BRIDGE, supra note 124, at 373-74; K. LIPSTEIN, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 67 (1974); Marsh & Swanney, The
Common Agricultural Policy, in INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 54

(J.Lodge ed. 1983).
131 Treaty of Rome, supra note 112, 298 U.N.T.S. at 30 (art. 38).
132 Id.
133

Id.

134 Bentil, Legal Aspects of EEC Agriculture, 118 SOLIC. J.670 (1974); Bentil, Agricultural

Law: Offer and Acceptance-I, 124 NEW L.J. 245 (1974).
135 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 69, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 141.
136 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 451, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 466.
137 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 103, 34 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 77.
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enact national laws in the same field.' 3 8 Furthermore, the EC Court has
ruled that all EEC secondary legislative measures for implementing the
various aspects of the CAP are incapable of being modified, varied or
derogated from by the Member States of the EEC.13 9 The EC Court
maintains that the provisions of the Treaty of Rome governing the establishment and the operation of the CAP take precedence, in the event of
any discrepancy, over the other rules regarding the establishment and
operation of the European Common Market. 14°
The CAP is aimed at ensuring an increase in agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress, rational development of agricultural
production, and optimum utilization of production factors, especially labor. In this way, the standard of living of all EEC farmers and
farmworkers would be raised, particularly the individual earnings of the
latter. 1 ' The CAP has as an objective, the stabilization of agricultural
markets in the EEC. 4 2 It is not only the interests of EEC agricultural
producers that the Treaty of Rome seeks to protect. The Treaty also
seeks to protect the interests of EEC consumers of farm products by ensuring that 1supplies
of farm products are secure and available at reason43
prices.
able
Id. at 113, 34 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 86.
139 See Commission of the European Communities v. France, 40 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 516 (1984);
138

Commission of the European Communities v. Germany, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1173; SA Nicolas Corman & Fils v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 1983 E. Comm Ct. J. Rep. 1627; Bundesanstalt
fur landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung v. Bruggen, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4647; H.P. Klughardt
oHG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4291; Debayser SA v. Fonds
d'Intervention et de Regularisation du March6 du Sucre, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1291; Adorno
v. Commission of the European Communities, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1469, 37 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 310; Commission of the European Communities v. Italy, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1411; SA
Roquette Frer6s v. French State Customs Administration, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2917; Providence Agricole de la Champagne v. Office National Interprofessionnel des C~riales, 1980 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2823; Criminal Proceedings v. Grosoli, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2621; Pigs and Bacon
Commission v. McCarren & Co., 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2161, 26 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 389;
Commission of the European Communities v. France, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 515, 20 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 161; Societi SADAM v. Comitato Interministeriale dei Prezzi, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 323, 20 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 183; Tasca, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J1.Rep. 291; Russo v. Aeienda di
Stato per gli Interventi sul Mercato Agricolo, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. 45; Galli, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 47, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211; Fratelli Grassi fuDavide v. Italian Finance Administration, 1972
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 443, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 322; R. & V. Haegeman v. Commission of the
European Communities, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J1.Rep. 1005, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 365; Publico Ministero della Republica Italiana v. Societa Agricola Industria Latte, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 119, 11
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 723; Commission of the European Communities v. Italy, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. 2.
Rep. 93, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 466.
140 Pigs Marketing Board v. Redmond, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2347, 24 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
177.
141 Treaty of Rome, supra note 112, 298 U.N.T.S. at 30 (art. 39(1)).
142 Id.
143 Id.
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The drafters of the Treaty of Rome may have had in mind the idea
of the EEC enjoying some measure of self sufficiency in food production. 1" Now, about 90% of the EEC's output of farm products is covered by the CAP.14 5 Thus, the EC Commission found it necessary in
1981 to make it clear that the EEC "could no longer grant unlimited
price guarantees because it had gone past the stage of self-sufficiency and
'
outlets were unreliable."146
One may ask whether the time has not come
for a shift of emphasis from the Treaty's concern with protection of the
economic interests of EEC farmers. The EC Commission has confronted
the latter issue and seeks to provide an answer to it. In its proposals for
reforming the CAP, the EC Commission takes the following view:
The keynote consists in placing responsibility on the producers and
stressing production at competitive prices. This means that Community farming will have to accept more of the market pressure to which
other economic sectors are subject. Only in this way will the Community be able
to develop its exports and maintain its share of the world
47
market. 1
The Treaty of Rome expects various socioeconomic factors to be
taken into account in establishing the means by which the CAP is to
operate. Thus, the particular nature of agricultural activity which results
from the social structure of agriculture and from structural and natural
disparities between the various farm regions of the EEC, the desire to
effect appropriate changes in the EEC's system of agriculture in a gradual, rather than in a sudden, manner, and the fact that agriculture in the
individual Member States of the EEC constitutes one of the main sectors
of the economy, ought to be taken into account. 148 One may ask whether
in the actual operation of the CAP, the competent authorities of the EEC
may not have overlooked some hard economic realities. Small wonder,
therefore, that the EC Commission, in its proposals for reforming the
CAP, considers the objective of such proposals
as being the adaptation of
49
the CAP to the new realities of the 1980's.1
B.

The CAP's Operation in Relation to the Development of the
European Common Market
The Treaty of Rome created a customs union on the basis of which

144 Bentil, AgriculturalLaw: Offer and Acceptance I, supra note 134, at 246.
145 Down on the Farm, supranote 125, at 52. The only major farm products not covered by the
CAP are potatoes and agricultural alcohol.
146 Rationalization of the Common Agricultural Policy: The Commission's Proposals, supra
note 127, at 7.
147 Id. at 8.
148 Treaty of Rome, supra note 112, at art. 39(2).
149 Rationalization of the Common Agricultural Policy: The Commission's Proposals, supra
note 127, at 7.
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the European Common Market was established and developed.1 50 Under
the EEC's customs union, the Member States of the EEC are required,
first, to abolish between themselves, customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, as well as other measures
having equivalent effects. 5 1 Second, they are required to observe a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy vis-a-vis imports
from non-EEC countries. 5 2 The establishment and operation of the
15 3
CAP presupposes the existence of the customs union for the EEC.
Therefore, the CAP requires the Member States of the EEC to abolish
between themselves, all customs duties, quantitative restrictions and
measures having equivalent effects on imports of agricultural products
into their national territories. The observance of such an economic/legal
norm is not meant to prevail in all situations as there
may be circum54
stances in which a derogation from it is permissible.'
The Treaty of Rome also provides for the establishment of a common organization of agricultural markets in the EEC as a means of attaining the objectives of the CAP. 5 In this regard, the competent EEC
authorities have recourse to various administrative and economic measures. In particular, they may regulate prices for individual agricultural
products, grant aid for the production and marketing of different farm
products, set up storage and carry-over arrangements for appropriate
farm products, and establish a common system for stabilizing imports or
exports of farm products. 5 6 In adminstering any or some of these measures, discrimination between EEC agricultural producers and consumers
is to be eschewed.' 57 Equally important is the provision of the Treaty of
Rome by which the competent EEC authorities are empowered to establish one or more agricultural guidance and guarantee funds to ensure
attainment of the CAP objectives. 5
The first measures for operating the CAP were initiated and brought
into effect in 1962. These measures consisted of the progressive establishment of common organization of various agricultural markets in the
EEC. Some of the most important ones were established by regulations
of the EC Council for the progressive organization of a common market
in, for example, cereals 59 and fruits and vegetables." 6 Other regulations
15o Treaty of Rome, supra note 112, at art. 9.
151 Id.
152
153

id at art. 3.
Id. at art. 44.

154 Id.
155
156

Id. at art. 40 (2).
Id. at art. 40 (3).

157 Id
158

Id. at art. 40 (4).

159 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 19, 5 J.0. COMM. EUR. 933 (1962) (Progressive Establishment of a Common Organization of the Market in cereals).
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of the EC Council were enacted in 1964 to cover a common organization
of the markets in, for example, milk and milk products, 16 rice, beef and
veal. In 1966, a regulation of the EC Council for the common organization of the market in oils and fats was also promulgated. 161 In 1967,
regulations of the EC Council were promulgated regarding the common
organization of the markets in pork, 163 poultry, 64 and sugar, 6- and in
1970 a regulation of the EC Council for the common organization of the
market in wine was promulgated.' 6 6 The regulation of the EC Council
on the common organization of the market in cereals, in particular, had
the markets for other agricultural prodserved as a prototype, although
1 67
ucts differed markedly.
The common organization of the various agricultural markets in the
EEC has made agricultural producers in the individual Member States of
the EEC look to an overall EEC controlled or EEC managed agricultural
market for returns on their farm produce, rather than to a system of
price guarantees or subsidies from their national governments. 168 The
overall EEC mechanism is capable of being effectively operated as long as
the EEC has the necessary funds for financing it. In the absence of such
financing, the control mechanism may break down, leaving a free-for-all
situation to be exploited by the national governments of the Member
States. In a recent comment on the operation of the CAP, the observation was made that "[t]he Rome treaty prohibits national subsidies that
give one set of farmers an unfair advantage. Yet straight national subsidies, flouting the law, are becoming more common as the CAP gets more
160 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 23, Apr. 4, 1962, 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 965 (1962), reprinted
in O.J. EUR. COMM. 97 (Special ed. 1959-62) (Progressive Establishment of a Common Organization
of the Market in Fruit and Vegetables).
161 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 13, 7 J.O. COMM. EUR. 7 (1964) (Progressive Establishment
of a Common Organization of the Market in Milk and Milk Products).
162 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 136/66, Sept. 22, 1966, 9 1.O. COMM. EUR. 3025 (1966),
reprintedin O.J. EUR. COMM. 221 (Special ed. 1965-66) (Establishment of a Common Organization
of the Market in Oils and Fats).
163 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 121/67, June 13, 1967, 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2283 (1967),
reprinted in O.J. EUR. COMM. 46 (Special ed. 1967) (Common Organization of the Market on
Pigmeat).
164 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 123/67, June 13, 1967, 10 J.O. COMM. EuR. 2301 (1967),
reprinted in O.J. EUR. COMM. 63 (Special ed. 1967) (Common Organization of the Market in
Poultrymeat).
165 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1009/67, Dec. 18, 1967, 10 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. 308) 1
(1967), reprinted in O.J.EUR. COMM. 304 (Special ed. 1967) (Common Organization of the Market
in Sugar).
166 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 816/70, Apr. 28, 1970, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 99) 1
(1970), reprinted in O.J. EuR. COMM. 234 (Special ed. 1970) (laying down additional provisions for
the Common Organization of the Market in Wine).
167 Bentil, Legal Aspects of EEC Agriculture, supra note 134, at 671.
168 Id.
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strapped for cash." 1' 69
C.

The Operation of the CAP And Its Impact on World Trade in
Farm Products

Arguably, in establishing the EEC's CAP, the drafters of the Treaty
of Rome may have been actuated more by considerations of EEC selfsufficiency in food and ensuring a free and competitive trade in agricultural products within the European Common Market, than by any likely
repercussions that the CAP would have on world trade m agricultural
products. 17 0 The EEC founding fathers may not have realized that the
future operation of the CAP would have a significant impact on world
trade in farm products. Yet operation of the CAP now impacts greatly
on this trade. Two main ways in which this has occurred are examined
here. These are: (1) the control or restriction of imports of non-EEC
farm products into the European Common Market area, and (2) the
granting of export subsidies for EEC farm products destined for nonEEC countries. Each of these two is considered separately.
1. The Control or Restriction of Imports of Non-EEC Farm Products into the European Common Market Area
The rules of the GATT' and the provisions of some of the agree172
ments reached at the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
attempt to ensure the removal or elimination of import controls or restrictions; the same rules and provisions, in various situations allow for
imposition of such controls or restrictions.1 73 Particularly, in world
trade in farm products, individual governments have availed themselves
of such permissive rules and provisions for protecting the agricultural
sector of their economies. For example, as previously noted, the secretariat of the GATT maintains that the rules and procedural mechanisms of
the GATT, which are capable.of being applied to regulate barriers to
world trade in farm products, hardly prohibit import restrictions. This is
especially true when such restrictions are necessary to enforce a govern169 Down on the Farm, supra note 125, at 52.
170 See, eg., Dam, supra note 11, at 256. "However much the architects of the [CAP] may
have wished to isolate it from the world economy, they have not been successful. . . Economic
forces aside, events on the world scene have forced the EEC to consider how European agriculture is
to fit into world trading patterns." Id.
171 GATT, supra note 1, at Al8, A28, A32, A40, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 14, 24, 28, 36, 55
U.N.T.S. at 204, 218, 224, 234 (arts. III, VIII, XI, XIII).
172 See supra note 90. Specifically note the provisions of the general agreement on the control
or elimination of tariff barriers to the conduct of international trade.
173 GATT, supra note 1, at A32, A34, A53, A58, A60, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 28, 30, 49, 54, 56
U.N.T.S. at 224, 228, 252, 262 (arts. XI, XII, XVIII, XIX, XX). See also supra note 90. Note the
provisions of the general agreement on the control or the elimination of tariff barriers which were
adopted at the end of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
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ment scheme which limits the production or marketing of domestic farm
products. 174
However, the control or restriction of imports of foreign farm products, in a blatant and unjustifiable manner, may constitute a breach of the
relevant rules of the GATT and of the relevant provisions of the agreements adopted at the Tokyo Round. Therefore, blatant and unjustifiable
import controls or restrictions imposed by, for example, the EEC on nonEEC farm products, may constitute a violation of the relevant rules and
provisions of the GATT. However, individual GATT Contracting Parties tend to accept or turn a blind eye to imposition of controls or restrictions of this kind because they themselves have done the same thing.
Therefore, under the CAP the EEC, through its system of imposing
variable levies on imports of such non-EEC products, has been able to
protect intra-EEC trade in its farm products or products of a similar
nature against competitive products from non-EEC countries. 175
The variable import levy system is designed to raise the price of imported non-EEC farm products at least to the level of prescribed EEC
prices for the same or similar EEC farm products.1 76 Considering that
about one quarter of the EEC's farm products1 77 lacks an established
intervention mechanism to prop it up, the variable import levy system is
utilized as the sole means of tariff protection for the farm products involved. 78 The EEC's variable import levy system is a means of keeping
cheaper foreign farm products out of the European Common Market so
as to bolster the socioeconomic interests of EEC farmers. There has been
hardly any strong objection to this policy from non-EEC countries.
1 79
However, recent EEC attempts to reintroduce duties on corn gluten
imported from the United States, which undercut the EEC's own overpriced feed grains, have met with strong opposition from the U.S.
Government.' 80
The imperative nature of the observance of this area of EEC law has
been underlined by the EC Court. The EC Court has sought to impress
upon the Member States of the EEC and their respective nationals the
need for strict compliance with the requirements of the variable import
levy system under the CAP. For example, in Re Import of Sweet Oranges:
174 GATT ACTIVrnES IN 1969/70, supra note 12, at 18.
175 See, e.g., Bentil, Legal Aspects of E.E.C Agriculture,supra note 134, at 671.
176 Id. See also Down on the Farm, supra note 125, at 52-53.
177 Down on the Farm, supranote 125, at 53. Specifically flowers, some cereals, good wine, and
some fruits and vegetables.
178 Id

179 Corn gluten is a cheap source of animal fodder produced in the United States.
180 A Sour Message for Mr. Reagan, THE ECONOMIST, July 3, 1982, at 38; Down on the Farm,
supra note 125, at 52-53.
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Government of the FederalRepublic of Germany v. EC Commission,"' l
the EC Court impressed upon the Member States of the EEC that there
must be proper compliance with the necessary requirements. 182 In that
case, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany requested that
the EC Commission free it of external customs duty when importing a
quota of sweet oranges from outside the EEC. 18 3 When the request was
rejected by the EC Commission, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany appealed to the EC Court asking for an annulment of the
decision. The EC Court affirmed the decision of the EC Commission and
dismissed the application of the government of the Federal Republic of
Germany.18 4 In affirming the decision of the EC Commission, the EC
Court stressed that a grant of the request might delay the rational evolution of the production of sweet oranges in the EEC and hinder the economic expansion of the less developed regions of southern Italy. 185
The EC Court has upheld the power of the EEC's authorities to
impose countervailing duties on farm products imported from non-EEC
countries as a means of rationalizing individual EEC agricultural markets established under the CAP. In R & V Haegeman v. EC Commission, 8 6 the EC Court affirmed the EEC's power to impose a
countervailing duty on wine imported into the EEC from a non-EEC
country, with the obvious intent to protect the wine trade within the European Common Market. 187 The applicant in that case was a Belgian
1 88
wine importer that imported foreign wines, especially from Greece.
The EC Commission imposed a countervailing duty on the wine imported from Greece into the EEC by the applicant firm. The EC applicant applied to the EC Court for an annulment of the EC Commission's
decision, on the ground that Greece had entered into an associate18 rela9
tionship with the EEC. The EC Court dismissed the application.
The EC Commission is vested with discretionary power to grant exemptions from applying the EEC's external tariff on farm products imported from non-EEC countries. However, the exercise of such
discretionary power must take into account various economic factors regarding the EEC's agricultural sector. In Re TariffQuota on Wine: Gov181 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 131, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 369.
182 Id. at 148, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 395.
183 Id. at 133, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 370.
184 Id. at 148, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 369.
185 See Bentil, LegalAspects ofEE.C. Agruculture, supra note 134, at 671.
186 1972 E. Comm. Ct. 3. Rep. 1005, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 365.
187 See Criminal Proceedings against Albert Clement Gerard Ces and Others, 1981 E. Comm.
Ct. . Rep. 3339. The EC Court had occasion to rule on the common organization of the market in
wine under the C.A.P. and the prohibition of imports of wine from non-EEC countries.
188 Greece only became a Member State of the EEC in 1980. Consequently, it was a non-EEC
country at the relevant time.
189 See Bentil, Legal Aspects of E.E.C. Agriculture, supra note 134, at 671.
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ernment of the Federal Republic of Germany v. EC Commission,190 the
EC Court pointed out that before exercising its discretionary power to
grant exemption from the EEC external tariff, the EC Commission had
to evaluate the state of the market for the product concerned and the
difficulties met by the Member States of the EEC in obtaining supplies of
it, as well as the likelihood and seriousness of any disturbance which
might be caused should the exemption be granted.19 1
2. The Granting of Export Subsidies for EEC Farm Products Destined for Non-EEC Countries
The EEC's major trading partners and other non-EEC countries did
not particularly object to EEC efforts, under the CAP, to control or restrict imports of non-EEC farm products into the European Common
Market area. However, they objected to the EEC's grant of subsidies for
agricultural products exported to non-EEC countries. Led by the United
States, Australia, Brazil, and Argentina, many countries have attacked
the EEC's system of export subsidies for its farm products, claiming it
depresses world prices of various farm products and enables the EEC to
grab an unfair share of world markets.' 92 Even Third World countries
have attacked the EEC's system of agricultural export subsidies because
the subsidies depress world prices for their tropical farm products and
reduce their export earnings.' 93
The United States, in particular, views the aspect of the EEC's CAP
regarding the granting of agricultural export subsidies "as the most pernicious aspect of the [CAP]."' 94 Consequently, the U.S. government
would like a GATT investigation into the EEC's system of agricultural
export subsidies.' 9 Indeed, the "Americans have relaunched a general
attack on the EEC's food export subsidies, which are helping European
farmers to gain ground in third countries at the expense of American
farmers."' 9 6 However, "the EEC never tires of pointing out [that] all
governments have for years, and with GATT acquiescence, intervened to
manage production and trade in agriculture," and that "[b]oth sides of
the Atlantic do it."' 97 There is no denying that the EEC's counter
charge contains a great deal of truth. Therefore, before proceeding to
examine the nature and extent of the EEC's system of export subsidies
190 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 63, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 347.
191 Treaty of Rome, supra note 112, 298 U.N.T.S. at 182 (art. 25(3)).
192 See Down on the Farm, supranote 125, at 52-53; ThrowingMoney at Farmers,THE ECONOMIST Jan. 8, 1983, at 68-69.
193 See supra note 192.
194 The Next Transatlantic War, supra note 129, at 33.
195 Id.
196 A Sour Message For Mr. Reagan, supra note 180, at 38.
197 The Next Transatlantic War, supra note 129, at 33.
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under CAP, it is necessary to examine the applicable rules and mechanisms of the GATT as they relate to the granting of governmental
subsidies.
Neither the provisions of the GATT concerning subsidies,1 98 nor
those of the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties adopted at the
Tokyo Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations,19 9 seek to prohibit outright the governmental granting of subsidies. Both sets of provisions recognize that subsidies are used by governments to promote important
objectives of national policy. However, it is also recognized that subsidies may have harmful effects on trade and production. Consequently, it
is not the granting of subsidies which is, ipso facto, deemed objectionable, but rather the harmful effects that subsidies may have on international trade. The Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties lays a
great deal of emphasis "on the effects of subsidies and that these effects
are to be assessed in giving due account to the internal economic situation of the signatories [to the Code] as well as to the state of international
economic and monetary relations." 2" This rather non-committal exhortation could hardly be said to impose any legal obligation or sanction on
individual governments of the GATT that grant subsidies.
On the other hand, the GATT Contracting Parties are keen on ensuring that measures, taken by individual governments to offset the effects of subsidies granted by other governments, are properly controlled
in order to prevent international trade wars. Various provisions of the
Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties are heavily directed toward
the problem of the imposition of countervailing duties or measures.20 1
Consequently, various substantive and procedural provisions of the Code
are concerned with the circumstances under which countervailing duties
or measures may be imposed and the methods by which disputes about
any such imposition may be investigated and settled. 20 2 With regard to
subsidies, all the Code seems to suggest is that, in granting them, governments should ensure that no harm is occasioned to the trading interests
of other countries. Obviously, it is not easy to determine or detect the
existence or the extent of governmental subsidies on products traded internationally. Hence, the Code's rather vague approach to the problem.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that one commentator has observed
that "[i]n 1980, the GATT negotiators agreed that subsidies for agriculture were unavoidable, and opted to turn a blind eye so long as the 2subsi3
dies were not used to expand markets beyond traditional shares.1
198 GATT, supra note 1, at AS1, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 47, 55 U.N.T.S. at 250 (art. XVI).
199 Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, supra note 92.
200 Id. at preamble.
201 Id. at arts. 1-4.
202 Id. at arts. 1-6, 16, 18.
203 Europe's Farmyard Follies, supra note 126, at 16.
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This means that individual governments are prepared to question
the legality or the propriety of granting particular government subsidies
should their international trading interest be threatened or harmed by
such subsidies. Various trading partners of the EEC have questioned the
legality or the propriety of the EEC's system of export subsidies favoring
the EEC farmers. The Government of the United States has rightly
claimed that EEC export subsidies for EEC farm products are used to
expand the EEC's agricultural markets beyond traditional limits, especially in world trade "in both cereals and sugar, as well as a host of
smaller markets." 2" In examining how this state of affairs has come
about, attention should now be turned to the EEC's system of export
subsidies for EEC farm products.
Mention has already been made that the Treaty of Rome provides
for the granting of aids, within the general framework of the CAP, for
the production and marketing of various farm products.20 5 In the common organization of individual EEC markets in various agricultural
products, the competent authorities of the EEC.have established a system of export subsidies or refunds for promoting the sale of EEC farm
products on the world market. For example, this has been2 0 done with
20 8
20 6
EEC exports of colza, rape, and sunflower seed; olive 0il; 7 sugar;
milk and milk products;20 9 beef and veal; 210 fruit and vegetables; 2 1 raw
tobacco; 2 12 cereal based compound feedingstuffs; 2 13 products processed
217 poultry; 2 1 rice; 2 19
214
cereals; 2 5 pork; 216 eggs;
from cereals and rice;
204 Id.
205 Treaty of Rome, supra note 112, at art. 40(3).
206 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 142/67, June 21, 1967, 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2461
(1967), reprinted in O.J. EUR. COMM. 94 (Special ed. 1967).
207 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 171/67, June 27, 1967, 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2600
(1967), reprinted in O.J. EUR. COMM. 136 (Special ed. 1967).
208 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 766/68, June 18, 1968, 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L
143) 6 (1968), reprintedin O.J. EUR. COMM. 155 (Special ed. 1968).
209 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 876/68, June 28, 1968, 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L
155) 1 (1968), reprintedin O.J. EUR. COMM. 234 (Special ed. 1968).
210 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 885/68, June 28, 1968, 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L
156) 2 (1968), reprintedin O.J. EUR. COMM. 237 (Special ed. 1968).
211 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2518/69, Dec. 9, 1969, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L
318) 17 (1969), reprintedin O.J. EUR.COMM. 545 (Special ed. 1969).
212 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 326/71, Feb. 15, 1971, 14 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 39)
1 (1971), reprinted in O.J. EUR. COMM. 76 (Special ed. 1971).
213 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2741/75, Oct. 29, 1975, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
281) 60 (1975).
214 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2744/75, Oct. 29, 1975, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
281) 65 (1975).
215 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2746/75, Oct. 29, 1975, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
281) 78 (1975).
216 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2768/75, Oct. 29, 1975, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
282) 39 (1975).
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products processed from fruit and vegetables;220 and wine.221 Furthermore, the EC Council has recently promulgated a general EEC secondary legislation, the "Advance Payment of Export Refunds in Respect of
Agricultural Products. 2 22 In seeking to ensure effective implementation
of the EEC's system of export subsidies for farm products, as established
by the EC Council, the EC Commission has adopted a general EEC Regof
ulation, "Laying Down Common Detailed Rules for the Application
223
the System of Export Refunds on Agricultural Products.

Export subsidies or refunds for EEC farm products are granted to
facilitate the sale of such products on the world's agricultural markets.
Normally, EEC farm products are more expensive within the European
Common Market because of the operation of the EEC's intervention system which provides price support for such products.2 24 The chances of
EEC farm products being successfully sold on world agricultural markets
at such exorbitant prices would be nil. Consequently, the prices of EEC
farm products must be considerably reduced before they can be competitive on world markets.225 Understandably, the United States has claimed
that "the EEC would not be able to compete successfully in an open
[world] market.1 226 The EEC's export subsidies for farm products make

up the difference between EEC and world prices for specific farm products to enable them to be sold more cheaply on world agricultural markets. Slightly more than half of the EEC's agricultural budget for the
CAP is now devoted to maintaining its system of export subsidies or
217 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2774/75, Oct. 29, 1975, 18 O.J.
282) 68 (1975).
218 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2779/75, Oct. 29, 1975, 18 O.J.

EUR. COMM.
EUR.

(No. L

COMM. (No. L

282) 90 (1975).
219 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1431/76, June 21, 1976, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
166) 36 (1976).
220 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 519/77, Mar. 14, 1977,20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 73)
24 (1977).
221 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 345/79/, Feb. 5, 1979,22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 54)
69 (1979).
222 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 565/80, Mar. 4, 1980, 23 O.J. EUR. Cmm.(No. L 62)
5 (1980). See also Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2943/80, Nov. 13, 1980, 23 OJ. EUR. Comm.
(No. L 305) 27 (1980).
223 22 0.. EUR.COMM. (No. L 317) 1 (1979).
224 The prices remain high despite the fact that the gap between EEC prices and world prices
for farm products has narrowed since 1977. In 1981, for example, EEC butter prices were 53%
higher than world market prices for butter, EEC beef prices were 52% higher than world market
prices for beef, EEC wheat prices were 38% higher than world market prices for wheat, EEC prices
for barley were 35% higher than world market prices for barley, EEC prices for sugar were higher
than those prevailing on the world market by 33% and EEC prices for pork were higher than those
on the world market by 24%. Down on the Farm, supra note 125, at 52.
225 Throwing Money at Farmers,supra note 192, at 68; A. PERRY & J. DiNNAGE,EEC LAW
214 (1981).
226 Throwing Money at Farmers,supra note 192, at 68.

CASE W. RES. J INT'L LV

Vol. 17:335

refunds.22 7
EEC export subsidies or refunds for farm products are paid to farmers by their national authorities. The level of the amounts are uniformly
fixed by the EEC for all the Member States of the EEC.2 28 Individual
Member States of the EEC are advanced sums by the EC Commission to
cover expenditures. 22 9 Farmers in individual Member States of the EEC
are not allowed to be paid more than the EEC prescribed amount of
export subsidy.2 3 ° Moreover, individual Member States of the EEC are
not allowed to pay their farmers a bonus or other extra financial reward
on top of the prescribed EEC limit of export subsidy or refund. The latter
aspect has been underlined by the EC Court in various cases.2 31 Individual Member States of the EEC are not allowed to overlook or ignore
conditions prescribed by 2the
EEC for the operation of the system of ex32
port subsidies or refunds.
The events and factors which have prompted the EEC to have recourse to export subsidies or refunds in order to promote the sale of farm
products need to be considered. Mainly, large surpluses of various farm
products in the EEC account for the costly grants of EEC export subsidies or refunds, which are a means of offloading the products on world
agricultural markets. The EEC's difficulty has been compounded by a
fall in EEC food consumption, a development likely to continue in view
of the decline in the population growth rate in the Member States of the
EEC.2 33 Up to the early 1970's the EEC was "a net importer of just
about every type of food, '2 34 but the situation has changed dramatically
since then. Two years ago, one commentator observed that:
Now stimulated by high prices and open-ended intervention guarantees, EEC farm output has shot through the barn roof. In ridding itself, at a loss, of the surplus, the EEC has for the first time in its
history become a net exporter of grain,235 has snitched three fifths of
227 Cheap Dinnersfor Communists and Sheikhs, THE ECONOMIST, July 10, 1982, at 45; Down

on the Farm, supra note 125, at 52.
228 See eg., supra notes 206-21'and accompanying text.
229 See A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, supra note 225, at 239-40.

230 Pigs and Bacon Comm'n v. McCarron and Company, Ltd., 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2161, 2189 (Preliminary Ruling) (interpreting art. 15(2) of EEC Regulation 2759/75).
231 See Kampffmeyer v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Getreide, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 213,
11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 711; Pigs and Bacon Commission v. McCarren, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2161, 26 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 389. For a consideration of the Kampffmeyer case, see Bentil, Legal
Aspects of EEC Agriculture,supra note 134, at 672.
232 See Ludwig Wunsehe & Co. v. Bundesanstalt fur Landwirtschaftliche Markordnung, 1982
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2319; Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v. Ludwig Wunsehe & Co., 1982 E.
Comm. Ct. J. R. 2493.
233 Rationalization of the Common Agricultural Policy: The Commission's Proposals, supra
note 127, at 7.
234 Free Trade for Farmers,supra note 17, at 18.
235 In 1981, for the first time, the EEC exported more than 20 million tons of cereals, an
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the world export market in butter and dried milk, has converted itself
from the world's largest importer of poultry into the world's largest
exporter, and emerged
as the second largest exporter of beef behind
236
only Australia.
In effect, the EEC has made substantial inroads into various world
agricultural markets at the expense of non-EEC countries which had previously been traditional suppliers to those markets. Yet, in economic
terms, the EEC is not enjoying a comparative advantage in the output of
the farm products involved. 237 Not only does the EEC itself experience a
great deal of financial loss, 2 38 but non-EEC countries, which are in a
position to produce the same or similar farm products more efficiently
and cheaply, are suffering considerable socioeconomic losses. Even the
Third World countries are not immune from the effects of the EEC's
system of export subsidies or refunds for farm products. Developing
countries stand to lose from the EEC's system of export subsidies or refunds since it deprives tropical farm products of potential world markets
and "helps keep poor countries poor. ' 239 Some of the trading competitors of the EEC, such as the United States, Australia, Brazil and Argentina, have objected to the establishment and operation of the EEC's
system of export subsidies for farm products.
III.

SOME OF THE FORMAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE OPERATION
OF THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE EEC'S CAP WITHIN
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE GATT

Complaints about some of the EEC's international trading malpractices regarding farm products have, from time to time, been brought to
the attention of the GATT, although few of them have been satisfactorily
resolved. Consequently, it is necessary to outline some of the essential
features of the dispute settlement procedures within the legal framework
of the GATT,before examining some of the cases to be resolved under
the GATT. The secretariat of the GATT has recently observed:
It is GATT's role in dispute settlement which attracts most public attention. The fact that the number of disputes brought before the
GATT in 1980 was the highest for many years is a clear reflection of
present economic difficulties, and of the resulting pressures on governincrease as compared with its 17 million tons of cereal imports. Down on the Farm,supra note 125,
at 52.
236 Europe's FarmyardFollies, supra note 126, at 16.
237 Free Trade for Farmers,supra note 17, at 18.
238 EEC taxpayers have been subsidizing sales of surpluses of some farm products to the Soviet
Union, various Arab countries, and the People's Republic of China. See Cheap Dinnersfor Communists and Sheikhs, supra note 227, at 45; The EEC Plays its China Card, THE ECONOMIST, February
26, 1983, at 38.
239 Europe'sFarmyardFollies,supra note 126, at 16; Down on the Farm, supra note 125, at 52.
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ments either to restrict competition from imports or to assist exports
by subsidies or other means. The disputes brought to GATT for settlement are evidence that the international trading system is under stress.
But they are also evidence that governments are continuing to put
their faith in the GATT rules as a basis for overcoming trading
problems. 40
Providing mechanisms for discussion and dispute settlement between its member countries or governments on matters of international
trade is one of the most important tasks of the GATT.24 1 Most disputes

between individual GATT Contracting Parties are settled directly between them on the basis of GATT rules which provide for consulta-

tion242 and dispute settlement2 43 procedures. In this regard, individual
GATT Contracting Parties need not bring the disputes before the GATT

itself. However, when bilateral discussions between individual GATT
Contracting Parties fail to produce a settlement, recourse is had to the
GATT Council's procedure of establishing panels of independent experts 2' that examine such differences or disputes and report their con-

clusions to the GATT Council.
One of the "framework" agreements reached in the Tokyo Round of
multilateral trade negotiations was an "Understanding on Notification,
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance in GATT."2 4 5 The
agreement was to clarify and strengthen the existing GATT rules on discussion and dispute settlement, especially regarding the use of individual
panels of experts.2 46 Also, for example, the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, adopted at the Tokyo Round multilateral trade negotiations, contains specific provisions on procedures for dispute
240 GATT AcTIvmEs IN 1980, supra note 66, at 6.
241 GATT AcnvITIEs IN 1982, at 53 (1983).
242 GATT, supra note 1, at A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266 (art. XXII).
243 Id. at A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266 (art. XXIII).
244 Usually, a panel of experts consists of three members appointed in their personal capacities
from GATT contracting countries and who have no direct interest in the trade dispute to be investigated. For a consideration of the vicissitudes gone through by the panel of experts system, see R.
HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES 7 (1978); K. KOCK, INTERNA-

TIONAL TRADE POLICY AND THE GAIT 1947-1967, at 93 (1969); Finlayson & Zacher, The GA7T
and the Regulation of Trade Bariers Regime Dynamics and Functions, 35 INT'L ORG. 561, 589
(1981).
245 GATT ACTIVITIEs IN 1982, supra note 241, at 53.
246 Id. When the Ministers of GATT member countries met in 1982, they agreed:
[Tlhat the understanding on Notification, Consultation, Surveillance and Dispute Settlement negotiated during the Tokyo Round provides the essential framework of procedures
for the settlement of disputes among contracting parties and that no major change is required in this framework, but that there is scope for more effective use of the existing
mechanism and for specific improvements in procedures to this end.
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settlement. 4 7 The newly established GATT Committee on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures2 48 is responsible for ensuring proper settlement of disputes by means of consultation and conciliation and by establishing individual panels of experts to investigate and report on them.2 4 9
Some of the formal complaints against the operation of the EEC's
CAP have involved charges of trade discrimination aimed at particular
GATT Contracting Parties, as well as charges of the illegal subsidization
of the production of processed agricultural products. However, most of
the formal complaints have involved charges of illegal grants of export
subsidies or refunds for certain farm products. For example, of the
eleven meetings of the GATT Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures held in 1982, seven were devoted to applying the dispute settlement procedures of the GATT Code on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties of 1980.250
In accordance with article 12 of the Code, the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures was notified of requests by the United
States to the EEC for consultations 251 regarding EEC subsidies on, for
example, the export of pasta, 252 poultry and poultry parts, 2 5 3 and sugar.
Following the consultations, the conciliation procedure provided for by
article 17 of the Code was set in motion regarding the United States'
complaints against alleged EEC export subsidies on pasta and sugar.2 5 4
At the same time, the United States asked for a utilization of the concilia-

tion procedure regarding its complaint against the EEC's subsidies for

2 55
the export of wheat flour.

247 Mostly the provisions of articles 12, 13, 17, and 18. GATT, BISD 71-77 (26th Supp. 197879).
248 The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties was organized in 1980 pursuant to
article 16 of the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, supra note 92, at art. 16. Between December, 1981 and July, 1982, the Committee
held seven meetings under the dispute and settlement procedures. GAIT, BISD 42 (29th Supp.
1981-82).
249 Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, supra note 92, at art. 18
250 GAIT AcTIvIams iN 1982, supra note 241, at 53.
251 Id.

252 Pasta products are manufactured from durum wheat in the form of fresh dough, such as
ravioli.
253 The United States complaint against the EEC's subsidies or refunds regarding poultry was
later suspended, apparently because the United States discovered that it was not the EEC, but Brazil,
which was keeping the United States out of the "lucrative" poultry market in the Middle East. As a
result of previous market sharing arrangements between the EEC and the United States, the community has dominated poultry exports to the Middle East. The EEC market share has remained stable
at about 53% in recent years, that of the United States at about 6%. Brazil, however, has come
from behind and in six years has raised its market share from virtually nothing to 35%. See, eg.,
The Next Transatlantic War, supra note 129, at 33-34.
254 Report of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, GATT, BISD 42, 46
(29th Supp. 1981-82).
255 lIa
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Some of the formal complaints against the operation of the EEC's
CAP have proceeded to the stage of investigation by individual panels of
experts, established within the dispute settlement framework of the
GATT. Although an Australian complaint against EEC refunds for exports of EEC sugar reached the stage of investigation by a GATT panel
of experts and the conclusions of the panel, which were mostly in favor of
Australia, were submitted to the GATT Council, 56 it will not be examined here. This complaint will not be examined because it was lodged
with the GATT Council and investigated by the GATT panel of experts
before25 7 the conclusion of the Tokyo Round multilateral trade negotiations. Only at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round was the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, with its specific provisions on dispute
settlement, adopted. Of the five complaints against the EEC's CAP considered here: one related to a charge of discrimination involving tariff
preferences allegedly granted by the EEC to some non-EEC countries,
another related to a charge of illegal subsidization of the production of
certain processed farm products, and the other three involved alleged
illegal grants of export subsidies for particular farm products. Each of
the five complaints will be considered separately.
A.

United States Complaint Against EEC Subsidies For Exports on
Wheat Flour

The United States appears to have become particularly upset about
EEC export subsidies for wheat flour in 1981. In particular, the United
States felt that wheat flour should not qualify for export subsidies, in
view of the fact that it was not, strictly speaking, a primary product.2 58
The United States could not overlook the fact that EEC exports of wheat
flour had helped the EEC to double its wheat exports to 14 million tons
between 1970 and 1980, even though U.S. wheat exports increased two
and one half times during the same period. 59 Consequently, the United
States requested consultations with the EEC on the issue, but the consultations appeared to be of no avail. Subsequently, the GATT Committee
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures utilized the conciliation procedure envisaged under article 17 of the GATT Code on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties. z"° This proved equally unsuccessful, with the re256 Report of the Panel of the GATr, GATT, BISD 290 (26th Supp. 1978-79); Australia v.
European Communities, 28 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 238 (1980). For a comment on some of the economic
aspects of the case, see Note, GATT, EEC Sugar Export Refunds Dispute, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L.
534 (1981).
257 The Australian complaint was first discussed by the Council of the GAIT on October 18,
1978, and a panel of experts was established on November 6, 1978, to investigate and report on it.
258 The Next Transatlantic War, supra note 129, at 33.
259 From 16.5 million tons to 41.9 million. See id
260 GAIT, BISD, supra note 254, at 46.
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suit that the Committee established a panel of experts to examine the
dispute2 6 1 and report its findings to the Committee.26 2
On the face of it, the EEC may have acted in breach of the rules of
the GATT. Yet, in 1984 alone, some $600 million appears to have been
spent by the U.S. government to finance price cutting wars abroad regarding export of cereals.26 3 One may ask whether the GATT panel of
experts, set up to investigate the complaint of the United States, would be
likely to reach a decision entirely unfavorable to the EEC. That panel of
experts would be hard put to ignore all the surrounding economic factors
and circumstances.
B.

United States ComplaintAgainst EEC Subsidiesfor Production of
Canned Peaches, Canned Pearsand Raisins

The United States formed the opinion that the EEC's grant of production subsidies for canned peaches, canned pears and raisins nullified
and impaired tariff bindings obtained from the EEC by the United States
on the products involved and on fruit cocktail. Therefore, in February,
1982 the United States had consultations with the EEC over the complaint.2 During the consultations, the United States made it clear to
the EEC that subsidies for the products were causing or threatening to
cause disruption of United States exports of these products to the Member States of the EEC. The consultations appeared to come to no satisfactory conclusion.
At the end of March, 1982, the United States requested the GATT
265
Council to set up a panel of experts to examine the complaint.
Although the EEC regretted that the consultations had been brief, it did
not oppose the U.S. request. However, the EEC requested that the drafting of the terms of reference for the panel be delayed until further consultations had taken place, especially in regard to its production aids on
dried grapes. The EEC's request was granted and consultations took
place in late April, 1982, but no satisfactory solution was reached.26 6
Both parties subsequently agreed to include their differences on dried
grapes in the terms of reference for the projected panel of experts, and
the GATT Council agreed to set up the panel of experts.
In lodging its complaint against the EEC, it is significant that the
United States had chosen to invoke specific provisions of the GATT,267
261

d.

262 This was done pursuant to the provisions of article 1 of the new GAIT code on Subsidies
and Countervailing Duties.
263 Bring Free Trade to the Farm, supra note 4, at 73.
264 GATT AcTsvmEs IN 1982, supra note 241, at 54.
265 Id
266 Id.

267 Namely, those of article XXIII(1) on Nullification and Impairment, by which individual
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rather than those of the new GATT Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. Although the U.S. complaint fell into the area of agricultural trade, the United States appeared to treat it as one falling into the
category of trade in manufactured goods. Moreover, the fact that the
United States invoked the nullification and impairment provisions of the
GATT suggests that the United States was prepared to take retaliatory
trade measures against the EEC. It is also noteworthy that the United
States requested the GATT Council, rather than the new GATT Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, to set up a panel of
experts to examine and report on the complaint against the EEC.
Regarding the substance of the complaint, it is important not to confuse it with that of a complaint against the granting of EEC export subsidies for farm products. In the instant case, the substance of the complaint
related to production aids for the products involved. In effect, at issue
was an alleged nullification or impairment of tariff benefits conceded by
the EEC to the United States. Furthermore, it is important that the
United States did not argue that the alleged conduct of the EEC had the
effect of allowing the EEC to gain access to non-EEC markets in the
products concerned. Rather, the United States contended that the EEC
subsidization measure threatened to cause disruption of U.S. exports of
the products involved to the Member States of the EEC. Consequently,
it is doubtful that a flagrant violation of the appropriate rules of the
GATT could result. But then, as some commentators have observed of
the dispute settlement process of the GATT: "[Miatters are generally
settled with only limited reference to existing rules."2'68
Perhaps the panel of experts, set up by the GATT Council to examine and report on the U.S. complaint, may adopt a more practical and
businesslike approach. After all, as one commentator has aptly observed:
"Panels, in short, had become a way of saying that the Contracting Parties wanted to put some teeth into a particular rule of requirement."2'6 9
GATT Contracting Parties may have recourse to retaliatory trade measures should they find that
some particular commercial malpractices of other individual GATT Contracting Parties either undermine or threaten to undermine substantially rights or benefits hitherto enjoyed under rules and
procedures of the GATT. The retaliatory trade measures may be taken only after consultation and
conciliation between the parties involved has taken place. Moreover, the Council of the GATT is
meant to be informed of any such situation before retaliatory trade measures may be taken. GATT,
supra note 1, at A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266.
268 See Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 244, at 589.
269 R. HUDEC, supra note 244, at 11. See also K. DAM, THE GAIT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 351-52 (1970); Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International
Trade, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747, 757 (1978).
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C. Complaint by a Group of Ten GATT Sugar-ProducingCountries
Against the Operation of the EECs Sugar Regime
The importance of sugar exports to the income of a number of Third
World countries and of Australia cannot be underestimated. Although
these countries produce mostly cane sugar, the production of beet sugar
by the EEC has become a serious threat to their access to the international free market trade in cane sugar. Recent expansion of beet sugar
production in the EEC has exacerbated the problem. Not surprisingly,
ten sugar producing GATT member countries, Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, India, Nicaragua,
Peru, and the Philippines, had recourse in April, 1982 to the dispute
settlement procedures of the GATT to address the difficulties they faced
because of the EEC's sugar regime.27 Although the complaint did not
actually get to the stage of examination and report by a GATT panel of
experts, it is of such significance as to warrant consideration here.
The joint complaint of the ten sugar producing countries draws attention to various essential features of the EEC's sugar regime, the operation of which may have had an adverse impact on the interests of the
sugar producing countries involved in the international sugar trade. The
group invoked the nullification and impairment provisions of the
GATI z7 1 rather than relying on, for example, the relevant provisions of
the new GATT Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. 72 The
joint complaint stressed how, traditionally, the national sugar industries
of the countries
involved had accounted for the bulk of world sugar
27 3
exports.

Three main issues, namely, the EEC's internal price support system
regarding sugar, the creation of sugar surplus in the EEC, and the application of the EEC's system of export subsidies to sugar, were raised in
the complaint.27 4 The EEC's maintenance of its internal price support
system for sugar was blamed for stimulating substantial and continued
growth in EEC sugar production, especially since 1976.275 This occurred
because the EEC's internal support prices for sugar far exceeded world
market prices for sugar. Unless the consumption of sugar in the EEC
increased to match the growth in EEC sugar production, the EEC was
bound to have recourse to the world sugar market to dispose of its sugar
surplus. As the complainants pointed out, domestic EEC consumption
270 GATT AcTvrrlEs IN 1982, supra note 241, at 56.
271 See, e-g., GATT, supra note 1, at A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266 (art.

XIII).
272
273
274
275

Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, supra note 92.
GATT Ac'rvrrlEs IN 1982, supra note 241, at 57.
Id. at 56.
Id. As a consequence, EEC sugar production reached about 50 percent higher in the period
1981-82 than its average production of sugar before 1977.
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of sugar had become stagnant and was even declining.27 6 Consequently,
the EEC's increased production of sugar led to "a corresponding growth
in its annual exportable surplus of sugar."2'77 The EEC still could not
successfully sell its surplus sugar on the world market, unless the internal
EEC prices for its sugar were considerably reduced vis-A-vis sales of EEC
sugar on the world market. To address the problem, the EEC was driven
by commercial logic to have recourse to granting export subsidies for
sugar from the European Common Market area that was destined for the
world market. As the complainants pointed out: "[T]he EEC's growing
exportable sugar surplus was disposed of with the continuing assistance
of whatever level of subsidy was required to sell the product on the world
market."27 This enabled EEC sugar producers to greatly expand their
share of world trade in sugar. 279
Against the background of the foregoing factors, the complainants
concluded that the EEC's sugar regime had "depressed world sugar
prices and exacerbated fluctuations in world sugar trade and [was] continuing to exercise these harmful effects." 2 ' Furthermore, the complainants observed of the situation that: "It is clear that their common sugar
regime and its application constitute a permanent source of uncertainty
in world sugar markets, and act to reduce market opportunities available
received by, the industries of other sugar exporting
to, and the28returns
1
countries.
In their joint representation to the EEC the complainants asked the
EEC to give "sympathetic consideration" to them and "to consult
promptly with a view to reaching a satisfactory and quick adjustment of
the matter."2' 82 While the EEC disliked the idea of acceding to a joint
action, it grudgingly informed the complainants that it would enter into a
set of ten bilateral consultations which would be held jointly. 2s3 The
consultations failed to bring about a satisfactory adjustment of the matter, and the complainants "reserved their rights under the General
Agreement. '284 In other words, they did not rule out the possibility or
the probability of taking retaliatory trade measures against the EEC in
accordance with the applicable provisions of the GATT. 28 5 The EEC,
however, only expressed hope that the Director-General of the GATT
276

Id.

277 Id.
278 Id. at 56-57.
279 Id. at 57.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 57-58.
283
284
285

XXIII).

Id. at 58.
Id.
See, e.g., GATT, supra note 1, at A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266 (art.
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would be able to hold further consultations with all the interested parties
for the purpose of overcoming the problem.2 86 The GATT Council took
note of the foregoing statements of the two sides.
Arguably, the complainants did not request the GAT Council to
establish a panel of experts to examine and report on the matter, feeling
that a subsequent finding against the EEC would be unlikely to result in
any concrete corrective or remedial measures on the part of the EEC.
After all, the findings and the report of the panel of experts, appointed by
the GATT Council on a previous Australian complaint against the granting of EEC sugar export subsidies,28 which mostly went against the
EEC, appeared not to have changed the attitude of the EEC in that
context.
D.

United States ComplaintAgainst EEC Subsidies on the Export of
PastaProducts

Taking the view that subsidies granted by the EEC for exports of
pasta products constituted a breach of applicable rules of the GATIT2 8 8
and the applicable provisions of the new GATT Code on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties,2 89 the United States set in motion the dispute settlement process of the GATT. As already noted, the United States notified the GATT Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of
its request for consultations with the EEC on the matter.2 90 When this
failed to resolve the problem, that Committee itself set in motion the
conciliation mechanism envisaged by the GATT Code on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties pursuant to article 17.291 This measure also failed
to resolve the dispute.2 92 Consequently, on June 14, 1982 the GATT
Committee established a panel of experts to examine and report on the
dispute.29 3
Like the complaint of the United States against an alleged illegal
grant of subsidies for EEC wheat flour,294 the instant United States complaint is not clear-cut. There is more to it than meets the eye, and the
findings and report of the panel of experts may not be entirely in favor of
the United States. The determination of the nature and extent of the
alleged EEC export subsidy may not be easy because pasta products are
286 GATT AcnvrrIEs IN 1982, supra note 241, at 58.
287 See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
288 The applicable rules are primarily those found under articles VI, XVI, and XXIII. GATT,
supra note 1, at A23, A51, A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 19, 47, 60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 212, 250, 266.
289 GATT, BISD 68 (26th Supp. 1978-79). See especially those provisions of article 9.
290 GATT, BISD 46 (29th Supp. 1981-82).
291 GATT, BISD 75 (26th Supp. 1978-79).
292 GATT, BISD, supra note 254, at 46.
293 Id. at 47.
294 Id.at 46.
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processed from durum wheat. A fortiori, the extent to which the alleged
EEC export subsidy may have helped the overall EEC exports of wheat
on world markets is not an easy determination.
E.

United States ComplaintAgainst EEC Tariff Preferences For
Certain Citrus Productsfrom Mediterranean Countries

The idea of establishing a customs union or a free trade area or association between individual member countries of the GATT is not discounted by the rules of the GATT. Rather, the rules of the GATT
regulate individual customs unions or free trade areas to prevent their
operation from acting as a barrier to the liberalization of international
trade. 295 The essential characteristics of a customs union have already
been outlined above.2 96 A free trade area or association is established
and operated by two or more countries with a view to ensuring that all
tariff barriers between such countries are removed. However, for trade
with nonparticipating countries, the participating countries are entitled
to establish their own individual tariff barriers vis-a-vis their own trading
activities. Individual member countries of a free trade area or association
thus undertake to accord to each other tariff preferential treatment which
they are not prepared to accord to nonmember countries.
In view of this, the rules of the GATT allow GATT Contracting
297
Parties to make recommendations to parties to free trade agreements
as to particularly objectionable features of such agreements. Agreements
establishing free trade areas or associations between the EEC and various
non-EEC countries, especially with some Mediterranean countries, have
become public knowledge. Yet it appears that member countries of the
GATT did not object to such agreements. Consequently, the EEC considered the tariff arrangements it had concluded with the Mediterranean
countries to be consistent with the applicable rules of the GATT.2 98
Nevertheless, in June, 1982 the United States strongly objected to
EEC tariff preferences granted to imports of citrus products from certain
Mediterranean countries. The United States notified the GATT of its
belief that the grant of such tariff preferences was inconsistent with the
main nondiscrimination rule of the GATT, namely, that which is established in article 1.299 The United States felt that the tariff preferences
had an adverse effect on U.S. citrus exports to the Member States of the
EEC.3" Consequently, the United States consulted with the EEC on the
GATT, supra note 1, at A66, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 62, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266 (art. XXIV).
See supra text accompanying notes 150-54.
GAIT, supra note 1, at A66, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 62, 55 U.N.T.S. at 268 (art. XXIV).
GATT AcTIvITiEs IN 1982, supra note 241, at 55.
GATT, supra note 1, at A12, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 62, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196.
300 GATT AcTIvITIES IN 1982, supra note 241, at 54.

295
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299
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matter, but apparently failed to resolve the problem. The United States
then requested the GATT Council to set up a panel of experts to examine
the dispute.30 1
From June to November, 1982 the GATT Council directed attention to two main issues arising out of the dispute. First, the Council
considered whether, as the United States insisted, any member country of
the GATT was entitled to request the establishment of a panel of experts
to examine a dispute under the rules of the GATT. The U.S. insistence
on such a right was widely supported by other GATT Contracting Parties. 30 2 Secondly, the GATT Council considered whether the U.S. complaint "represented a challenge to the principle of special preferences
enjoyed by [the Mediterranean] countries" concerned in the EEC market.30 3 This principle was also defended by a large number of GATT
Contracting Parties.3 "4
Although the Director-General of the GATT, at the request of a
number of GATT Contracting Parties, met both sides of the dispute to
explore the possibility of working out a practical solution to the problem,
it was of little avail. The Director-General of the GATT concluded
"that it appeared impossible to conciliate the outstanding differences between the two sides. ' 3 5 Further discussion was undertaken in the
GATT Council. During the course of the discussion some member
countries of the GATT expressed preference for the establishment of a
working party 3 6 rather than of a panel of experts to examine the important issue of principle.30 7 In November, 1982 the Council agreed to establish 08a panel of experts to examine the complaint of the United
3
States.
Whether this panel of experts comes to any firm conclusions on the
United States complaint, it is already quite evident that the EEC's system
of tariff preferences in favor of imports of citrus products from various
Mediterranean countries has the support of a large number of the member countries of the GATT. This seems to strengthen the moral, as well
301

Id. at 55.

302

Id.
Id.

303
30 4

Id.
305 Id.
306 Under

the dispute settlement provisions of the GATT, individual ad hoe working parties
are set up, from time to time, to investigate and make recommendations regarding particular trade
disputes between GATT Contracting Parties. A working party is usually composed of delegates
from the GATT Contracting Parties actually involved in a trade dispute. Consequently, partisan
political considerations tend to influence the deliberations of the members of a working party. One
commentator has characterized individual GATT working parties as small groups designed for political exchange and negotiation. R. HUDEC, supra note 244, at 6.
307 GATT AcrIvrIEs IN1982, supra note 241, at 55.
308 Id.
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as the legal, position of the EEC in the dispute. It is difficult to see how
the appointed GATT panel of experts could fail to be influenced by this.
Nor could it fail to take into account the rather difficult economic circumstances of the Mediterranean countries concerned. Arguably, in the
instant case it would be difficult for the panel of experts to return a verdict in favor of the United States.
IV.

GENERAL OVERVIEW

It would be erroneous and misleading to think that it is only the
EEC whose particular activities in the agricultural sector have had an
adverse impact on world trade in farm products. Various other governments of the industrialized nations of the western world have, by means
of their unstinting financial and other support for the agricultural sectors
of their economies, adversely impacted the liberalization of international
trade in farm products. One commentator, on some of the government
practices which have undermined the liberalization of world trade in agricultural products has observed: "The developed countries will have to
take the lead in abolishing these abuses-they are both the biggest offenders and the biggest victims. The most protectionist are those industrial nations which are also big food exporters-not only the [EEC] and
America, but also Australia and Canada."3 9 However, as a matter of
degree, the operation of certain aspects of the EEC's CAP appears to be
more to blame for the present plight of world trade in agricultural
products.
No doubt, the current world economic situation has prompted governments of the industrialized market economies of the western world to
become even less liberal in their attitudes toward international trade in
agricultural products. The secretariat of the GATT has observed of the
state of the world economy in 1980: "Protectionist pressures are high in
many countries, and international trade disputes have been numerous." 3 10 Also, in its recent recommendations for radical reform of the
EEC's CAP, the EC Commission stated: "On the world markets, where
effective demand depends on the solvency of importers, which in its turn
is dependent on the recovery of the world
economy and credit availabil311
ity, there is no improvement in sight.
One would have thought that the various agreements reached at the
Tokyo Round multilateral trade negotiations in 1979 could be effectively
translated into action to ensure a meaningful liberalization of world trade
in farm products. Yet this has hardly materialized, even though the EEC
309 Bring Free Trade to the Farm, supra note 4, at 71.
310 GATT AcTIvrr=S IN 1980, supra note 66, at 5.
311 Rationalization of the Common Agricultural Policy: The Commission's Proposals, supra
note 127, at 7-8.
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and the governments of the major trading nations of the western world
have entered honestly into their international commitments in international trade in agricultural products. The various agreements reached at
the Tokyo Round were meant to be applicable not only to international
trade in industrial or manufactured goods but also to international trade
in farm products.3 12 However, it still seems as though no binding legal
commitments were made concerning the need to liberalize world trade in
farm products. After all, the GATT Contracting Parties were recommended "further to develop active co-operation in the agricultural sector
within an appropriate consultative framework, and to define this framework and its tasks as soon as possible."3'13 Moreover, the Council of the
GATT still recognizes that "there is an urgent need to find lasting solutions to the problems of trade in agricultural products."3 4 At the same
time, the major trading nations of the GATT seem indifferent or lukewarm towards doing something important about the problem: "[O]nly
two years ago, when GATT met in full ministerial guise, the question of
farm trade nearly broke up the meeting."3'15
Nevertheless, one may ask whether the situation is so hopeless as to
have left no chance for improvement. It would be a counsel of despair if
it were thought that nothing could be done to improve the situation.
Consequently, various suggestions for improving the situation will be examined here. It is important to examine such suggestions from the respective standpoints of the GATT and the EEC in order to fit them into
the general layout of the study.
A.

Steps Capable of Being Taken by the GATT to Promote Effective
Liberalizationof World Trade in Farm Products

The Kennedy Round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations,
which sought to tackle the problem of the liberalization of world trade in
agricultural products, dismally failed to yield any concrete and meaningful results.31 6 Moreover, the Tokyo Round of GATT multilateral trade
negotiations, which was deemed a great success for liberalizing world
trade in general, can now be seen to have also failed to ensure a meaningful and effective liberalization of international trade in farm products.
Consequently, one wonders whether recourse to such periodic marathon
GATT multilateral trade negotiations are really appropriate or wellsuited to address the issue of liberalization of international trade in agricultural products. An erstwhile leading authority on international eco312

note 88,
313
314
315
316

See GATT AcTIvmIEs IN 1978, supra note 97, at 43; GATT AcrxvmEs IN 1979, supra
at 27.
GATT AcanvmEs IN 1978, supra note 97, at 45.
Thirty-Eighth session at Ministerial level, GATT, BISD 9, 16 (29th Supp. 1981-82).
Bring Free Trade to the Farm, supra note 4, at 71.
See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
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nomics felt that problems of trade in agricultural products were
politically too different to be resolved by such periodic marathon GATT
multilateral trade negotiations. Instead, he suggested that the solution
for such a problem "is more amenable to continued negotiation within
the normal consultative machinery of GATT than a formal bargaining of
the Kennedy Round type. ' ' 317 A similar view has been, more recently,
taken by another commentator.3 1 8
Recourse to the more regular meetings of the GATT Council or of
GATT ministerial sessions may be more appropriate or better suited to
solving problems of world trade in agricultural products. There also appears to be a need to set up a permanent body charged with reviewing the
operation and effects of agreed measures regarding world trade in farm
products, and making recommendations, from time to time, for particular problems in the same area. In this regard, the recent decision of the
GATT Contracting Parties 319 to establish a Committee on Trade in Agriculture, open to all GATT Contracting Parties, to carry out the task
just outlined, 320 is of some interest.
At the regular meetings of the GATT Council or at the regular
GATT ministerial sessions, more crucial issues may be accorded priority,
while incidental ones may be addressed at other appropriate times. Priority may be accorded to subjecting international trade in farm products
to virtually the same regulatory rules and scrutiny of the GATT, as is
international trade in industrial or manufactured goods. This may be an
idealistic pursuit, since attempts to do this during the Kennedy and the
Tokyo Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, proved fruitless. Yet
the theoretical and the practical significance of the idea, as a means of
ensuring a meaningful and effective regulation of world trade in agricultural products, cannot be denied. At a meeting of the GATT Council in
November, 1984 there was agreement to discuss ways of subjecting world
trade in farm products to the kind of GATT rules and mechanisms applicable to international trade in manufactured goods.32 ' This was immediately described as "the first serious attempt to get to grips with the
agricultural trade problem. ' 32 2 Alongside with according priority to the
issue just considered, regular meetings of the GATT Council or of
GATT ministerial sessions would need to address the following crucial
issues, namely: market access and supplies regarding farm products; actual or potential undue recourse to exceptions or derogations permitted
317 The Kennedy Round, supra note 18, at 478.
318 Bring Free Trade to the Farm, supra note 4, at 71.
319 The contracting parties constitute the main policy and decision-making body of the GATT.
At times, it is interchangeable with the Council of the GATT.
320 See GATT, BISD, supra note 314, at 17.
321 Bring Free Trade to the Farm, supra note 4, at 71.
322 Id
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under the appropriate rules of the GATT; protection of the special interests of the Third World countries in international trade in farm products;
and means of ensuring a proper and effective observance of established
rules and mechanisms of the GATT. Each of the foregoing will be examined separately.
There is no denying that the prevention or restriction of access to
imported farm products poses a fundamental problem for the idea of the
liberalization of international trade. Consequently, serious efforts must
be made to remove import tariffs and quota, in particular. This may not
be easy, considering that various import tariffs and quotas on agricultural
products appear to be deeply entrenched in some individual governmental systems.3 23
However, it is significant that a recent decision of the GATT Contracting Parties recommended an examination of tariff and nontariff
measures affecting market access and supplies. The examination would
be done with a view to achieving greater liberalization in international
trade in farm products, based on overall reciprocity and mutual advantage under the rules of the GATT.3 2 4 Furthermore, it was recommended
that prompt attention be given to the problem of escalated tariffs on farm
products with increased processing so as to ensure effective action towards eliminating or reducing such escalation, especially where it would
inhibit international trade.32 5 With regards to the latter the efforts of the
GATT Customs Co-operation Council to evolve a common system for
classifying products for tariff and statistical purposes were of the utmost
importance. In particular, it was agreed that wide acceptance of such a
would facilitate international trade in agricultural
common 3 system
26
products.
The problem of the adverse effects of export subsidies or other forms
of export assistance regarding farm products has become thorny. As one
commentator has aptly noted:
Export subsidies do damage both to the countries that supply them
and to countrieg that produce competing products. They can decimate
farming in poor countries, leaving them unable to produce food which
Nearly 60 percent of farm exports
they can no longer afford to import.
32 7
come from industrial countries.
The need for bringing under effective control government systems of export subsidies for farm products is apparent. It is thought that the
"GATT may find it easier to tackle export subsidies than to start remov323 Id.

324 GATT,BISD, supra note 314, at 16.
325 IM at 18.
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ing import tariffs and quotas"32' 8 on farm products.
Either because of the peculiar nature and application of export subsidies for farm products, or the logistic difficulties involved in identifying
and assessing the extent of such subsidies, the GATT is not particularly
well prepared to address the problem. The most recent decision of the
GATT Contracting Parties on the issue merely recommends that an examination be conducted of the problem by assessing the effectiveness of
the existing GATT rules applicable to it in light of actual experience.32 9
Although other forms of export assistance for farm products were to be
included in the examination, just the avoidance of "subsidization seriously prejudicial to the trade or interests of [other GATT] contracting
parties, ' 33 1 is an essential objective of the examination. Yet, it would not
be easy to make a determination that a given export subsidy or other
form of export assistance for farm products is seriously prejudicial to the
trade or interests of individual GATT contracting governments. Unless
an effective monitoring system is established, in tandem with the existing
GATT system of notification of subsidies, it is difficult to see how the
problem could be seriously and meaningfully resolved.
Actual or potential recourse, unduly taken by individual GATT
contracting governments, to derogations or exceptions permitted by the
rule of the GATT certainly frustrates the liberalization of international
trade in farm products.331 Individual GATT contracting governments
have been known to hide behind such rules of derogation or exception to
the GATT when engaging in activities restrictive of the free flow of agricultural products in world trade. To ensure that such abuses do not occur, objective criteria for both assessing the reasons for recourse to the
derogations and for surveillance over individual governmental reliance
on the measures, need to be established. Yet, the recent decision of the
GATT Contracting Parties on the issue attempts to do no more than
recommend an examination of "trade measures affecting agriculture
maintained under exceptions or derogations without prejudice
332 to the
rights of contracting parties under the General Agreement.,
The need for protecting the special interest of the Third World
countries in world trade in farm products generally and in tropical farm
products in particular, has been continually acknowledged by the GATT
since the late 1960'S. 333 Yet, individual major GATT trading nations
Id.
329 GATT, BISD, supra note 314, at 16.
328

330 Id.

331 GATT AcnvrrEs IN 1982, supra note 241, at 36-37.
332 GATT, BISD, supra note 314, at 16.
333 It was in 1969 that part IV of the GATT relating to Trade and Development was added to
the original provisions of the GATT, and a separate committee on Trade and Development was
established for ensuring its implementation.
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have, occasionally, gone back on their commitments that would allow
some farm products from the Third World countries access to their agricultural markets.33 4 What is wanting is the willingness of the major
GATT trading nations to make room for some important economic sacrifices in favor of the Third World countries. The most recent decision of
the GATT Contracting Parties called for an examination of how to improve the agricultural trade of the Third World countries, considering
their special needs and the existing GATT rules providing for differential
and more favorable treatment for them.3 35 Regarding, in particular,
their interests in international trade in tropical farm products, the GATT
Contracting Parties decided to carry out consultations and negotiations
336
aimed at further liberalization of international trade in those products.
The work program pursued by the Committee on Trade and Development was to provide a basis for the task assumed by the GATT Contracting Parties.3 37
In order for the removal of the tariffs and quotas to be meaningful
and effective, the GATT must know whether they are in fact removed by
the individual GATT contracting governments. Equally, to ensure that
export subsidies or other forms of export assistance for farm products are
not applied so as to seriously prejudice the trading interests of individual
GATT contracting governments, some form of surveillance over the
practice is essential. The same can be said of the practice of individual
GATT contracting governments in having undue recourse to derogations
or exceptions permitted by the appropriate rules of the GATT. A worthwhile GATT system of surveillance is also called for vis-a-vis the protection of the international trading interests of the Third World countries.
Hitherto, the GATT has only sought to establish a system of notification of trading activities or practices of its individual member governments in specific areas. Now, the most recent decision of the GATT
Contracting Parties has recommended the introduction of an "improved
and unified system of notifications" in the general area of world trade in
farm products, "so as to ensure full transparency."3'3 8 Nevertheless, effective monitoring of whether all necessary notifications have been made
to the GATT, in such context, has been overlooked or taken for granted.
334 See Examination of Protective Measures Affecting Impact from Developing Countries,
Nov. 28, 1979, GATT, BISD 219 (26th Supp. 1978-79); Report of the Committee on Trade and
Development, Nov. 26, 1980, GATT, BISD 48 (27th Supp. 1979-80).
335 GATT, BISD, supra note 314, at 17.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id.
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Measures Capable of Being Undertaken by the EEC to Render the
Operation of the CAP Less Burdensome to Other GATT
Members

The operation of the EEC's CAP has had adverse effects on world
trade in farm products. Both the operation of the external features and
the operation of the internal features of the CAP have had an adverse
impact on international trade in farm products. The complaint brought
by a group of ten GATT sugar producing countries against the EEC's
sugar regime in April, 1982339 should provide some insight into this.
There is some evidence of undue parochialism and a degree of selfishness
in the EEC's attitude regarding the operation of the CAP. This attitude
must change if international trade in agricultural products is to stand a
fair chance of being liberalized. As one commentator has observed:
"European farm ministers seldom look beyond their own farmers' troubles, demonstrations and votes. They now need to do so." 3" The need
for reforming the CAP and its operation to ensure that it only has a
negligible adverse impact on international trade in agricultural products
could not be more apparent.
Three aspects of the operation of the EEC's CAP can be characterized as the ones most in need of reform in order to facilitate the liberalization of world trade in farm products. These are: the unnecessary
creation of surpluses of farm products in the EEC, the imposition of burdensome tariffs and quotas on imports of non-EEC agricultural products
into the European Common Market, and the costly granting of export
subsidies for EEC farm products. Each of these aspects of the CAP and
how it can be reformed is considered separately.
The EEC has progressed from being a net importer of farm products
to becoming a net exporter of farm products.34 1 The EEC has been able
to increase its output of farm products, but in doing so, it has created
large surpluses of them.3 42 If these farm surpluses were kept or disposed
of entirely within the European Common Market, they would have little
or no adverse impact on world trade in agricultural products. However,
the EEC has offloaded its surplus of farm products cheaply onto the
world agricultural markets. This has had an adverse effect on world
trade in farm products. Worse still, by its system of granting unlimited
price guarantees for EEC farm products in structural surplus, the EEC
has irresponsibly encouraged the creation of more of such surpluses. The
339 See supra notes 270-87 and accompanying text.
340 Europe's FarmyardFollies, supra note 126, at 16.
341 See, eg., Id.; Rationalizationof the Common AgriculturalPolicy: The Commission'sProposals, supra note 127, at 7.
342 See, e.g., Agricultural Prices and Related Measures for 1984/85: Commission Proposals,
supra note 128, at 1-8; Europe'sFarmyardFollies, supra note 126, at 16.
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need, therefore, for operating the EEC's CAP so as to obviate or minimize this problem has become evident.
Fortunately, the EEC has realized the seriousness of the problem
and has begun to address it. For example, in its report on the May, 1980
mandate, the EC Commission concluded: "[I]t is neither economically
sensible nor financially possible to give producers a full guarantee for
products in structural surplus." 4 3 Later, in its Guidelinesfor European
Agriculture of 1981,a" the EC Commission called for a restriction of the
price guarantee for a given volume of farm products, beyond which some
of the cost must be borne by the producers. This became known as the
"guidance threshold" mechanism, or system. Since then, the EC Council
has approved34 5 the EC Commission's proposals to establish guarantee
thresholds for various farm products,34 6 in addition to those being already operated. 47 No longer can price guarantees for various EEC farm
products be called open-ended. Beyond the thresholds, EEC agricultural
producers can no longer expect the EEC to provide the same price guarantees that it has provided in the past for their surplus output.
This is a policy change regarding the operation of the EEC's CAP.
The EC Commission has maintained that "the objective of this policy
change has been to achieve a more consistent relationship between the
guarantees and the market itself and to dovetail
them into a long-term
348
plan for rationalization of the farm sector.,
It is too early to assess the efficacy of the new guarantee threshold
system in discouraging or significantly reducing the unwarranted production of various kinds of agricultural surpluses within the European Common Market. The EC Commission hopes that the new system of
guarantee thresholds will lead to the introduction of a system of production quotas for various EEC farm products, and that the latter will im349
pose a super-levy on any additional quantities of farm output.
Although the EC Commission has called for adoption of a "prudent
price policy" to narrow the gap between prices for farm products in the
30
EEC and those charged by non-EEC competitors, especially in cereals,
materialization also remains to be seen.
343 BULL. EUR. COMM. 63 (Supp. Jan. 1981).
344 BULL EUR. COMM. 63 (Supp. Apr. 1981).
345 Review of the Common AgriculturalPolicy andAdoption ofAgriculturalPricesfor 1984/85,
17 BULL EuR. COMM. 13 (No. 3 1984).
346 Namely, for cereals, milk, colza, rape seed and processed tomatoes. Subsequently, sunflower, durum wheat, and dried grapes have been added to the list of farm products concerned.
347 Namely, those for sugar and cotton.
348 Review of the Common AgriculturalPolicy andAdoption ofAgriculturalPricesfor 1984/85,
supra note 345, at 13.
349 Rationalization of the Common Agricultural Policy: The Commission's Proposals, supra
note 127, at 8.
350 I[J
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Another important aspect of the operation of the EEC's CAP is the
imposition of burdensome tariffs and quotas on imports of non-EEC
farm products into the European Common Market. Other major trading
nations of the GATT have also been known to do the same in similar
circumstances. The United States, for example, has imposed quotas on
imported dairy products and sugar. 35 ' However, the nature and extent
of the EEC's tariffs and quotas on imported non-EEC farm products appears to be worse, they have been described as punitive. 3 "2 To significantly reduce or remove most of its tariffs and quotas on imported farm
products from its major non-EEC trading partners on a basis of reciprocity the EEC would have to negotiate uniform bilateral agreements with
them. However, the EEC should be able to introduce a single
nonreciprocal uniform system to ensure access of farm products from the
Third World countries into the European Common Market.
The EC Commission has called for adoption of measures to rectify
market imbalances caused, in particular, by imports of non-EEC cereal
substitutes and vegetable oils. 3 3 However, it has subsequently called for
the negotiation of agreements with non-EEC countries regarding imports
of various farm products from them. In relation to imports of non-EEC
cereals, the EC Commission has sought a mandate from the EC Council
to negotiate with non-EEC countries on stabilizing imports of cereal substitutes.3 54 Concerning milk and milk products, the EC Commission intends to reduce the quantity of butter imported from New Zealand.35 5
Furthermore, while the EC Commission has asked that a decision on the
EEC's variable premium on lamb and mutton be postponed pending the
outcome of negotiations with non-EEC countries regarding a minimum
import price for the meat, it has proposed a downward revision of the
import "balance sheet" for meat from non-EEC countries over a stipulated period.35 6
Regarding the thorny problem of grants of export subsidies for EEC
farm products under the CAP, its adverse effects are felt by both, nonEEC countries and the EEC. To the EEC, the system is very costly. For
example, out of an EEC farm budget of $13.2 billion in 1984, $4.6 billion
was spent on "exporting food at less than it cost to produce. '3 7 Such
export subsidies unduly enable the EEC to increase its share in the inter351 Bring Free Trade to the Farm, supra note 4, at 71.
352 Id.
353 Rationalization of the Common Agricultural Policy: The Commission's Proposals, supra
note 127, at 8.
354 Review of the Common AgriculturalPolicy and Adoption ofAgriculturalPricesfor 1984/85,
supra note 345, at 14.
355 Id.
356 Id.

357 Bring Free Trade to the Farm, supra note 4, at 71.
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national agricultural trade and to obtain for itself some of the international agricultural markets traditionally controlled by its other GATT
trading partners.35 8 The EEC's system of export subsidies is viewed as,
unduly depressing world prices for agricultural products. There is an
urgent need for the EEC to take positive steps to resolve the problem if a
liberalization of world trade in farm products is to become a reality.
The close connection between the EEC's system of export subsidies
and the existence of large surpluses of farm products in the EEC must be
acknowledged. Realistically, it would be overly optimistic to expect the
EEC to abolish the system over night. The gravity of the problem can be
minimized by well-integrated EEC corrective or remedial measures
under the CAP. The EEC's high prices for farm products on the European Common Market must either be drastically reduced, or quantitative
controls must
be imposed on the production of individual farm products
35 9
in the EEC.
The EC Commission has recently submitted some proposals for the
envisaged change. First of all, the EC Commission believes that the
EEC's new system of guarantee thresholds and, particularly, involvement
of EEC agricultural producers in disposal costs of their products, will
enable export of EEC farm products to be "developed on a sound basis.' ' 3 ° A reduction of the large surpluses of EEC farm products would
be effective enough to minimize the harmful effects on world trade in
agricultural products of the EEC's system of granting export subsidies
for EEC farm products. Second, the EC Commission has stressed the
need to prevent deterioration of world prices for farm products through
closer international cooperation.3 6 1 Stability in world prices for primary
products, brought about by cooperation between all the contracting parties to the GATT, would make it unnecessary for the EEC to have undue
recourse to its system of export subsidies for EEC farm products.3 62
Third, the EC Commission intends to promote exports of EEC farm
products by concluding long-term contracts with its main non-EEC customers.3 63 By this measure it is expected that the actual or likely adverse
effect of the EEC's system of export subsidies for its farm products on the
358 See, eg., supra notes 270-87 and accompanying text (the complaint of ten GATT sugar
producing countries against the operation of the EEC's sugar regime).
359 Down on the Farm,supra note 125, at 55.
360 Review of the Common AgriculturalPolicy andAdoption ofAgriculturalPricesfor 1984/85,
supra note 345, at 14.
361 See Rationalizationof the Common AgriculturalPolicy: The Commission'sProposals,supra
note 127, at 9.
362 Id.; see also Review of the Common AgriculturalPolicy andAdoption ofAgriculturalPrices
for 1984/85, supra note 345, at 14. For a similar suggestion, see Cheap Dinnersfor Communists and
Sheikhs, supra note 227, at 46.
363 Rationalization of the Common Agricultural Policy: The Commission's Proposals, supra
note 127, at 9.
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stability of world agricultural markets and prices would be greatly reduced or rendered insignificant. 3 Whether the proposals of the EC
Commission will be fully endorsed and given legal force by the EC Council remains to be seen. They appear to be reasonable enough to merit
serious attention and to be given a favorable response.
V.

CONCLUSION

The economic, political and social significance of the agricultural
sector of the economy to all governments cannot be underestimated.
Farmers have, with the unstinting support of their national politicians
and governments, been able to exclude or restrict imports of cheaper foreign farm products and prevent them from competing effectively with
their own. The EEC has been particularly guilty of this conduct. The
situation calls for meaningful and effective international measures for its
correction or improvement. Yet attempts by the GATT, in the course of
the Kennedy and the Tokyo Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, to
liberalize world trade in farm products have not been particularly
successful.
However, the problem is not an insoluble one. Regular discussion of
the main issues involved, within the general legal framework of the
GATT, may be able to diminish or prevent the risk of yet more expensive
trade wars, especially between the major agricultural trading nations.
The EEC should be capable, on its own, to reform the operation of its
CAP so as to render its effects on world trade in farm products less
harmful to its other trading partners. Already, the EC Commission has
made various important proposals to effect some drastic changes in the
operation of the CAP. Yet, the national economic and political interests
of the individual Member States of the EEC have prevented the EC
Council from adopting and giving proper effect to the EC Commission's
proposals. The constant disagreement among the Member States of the
EEC, as to the character and operations of the EEC's CAP has aggravated the difficulties.
The lack of appropriate political will on the part of the individual
member countries of the GATT and the EEC to make the necessary concessions to the organization and operation of the agricultural sector has
frustrated the liberalization of world trade in farm products. Consequently, national and supranational protectionist measures regarding international trade in farm products abound. In the process, not only the
agricultural interests of the developed market economies, but also those
of the Third World countries have been adversely affected. The latter
countries have been more seriously affected. After all, they are depen364 See, e.g., Cheap Dinnersfor Communists and Sheikhs, supra note 227, at 46.
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dent mostly on the international sales of their farm products for export
income.
A general spirit of political goodwill is necessary as well as a serious
commitment on the part of the leading agricultural trading nations of the
western industrialized world to effectively liberalize world trade in farm
products. It can only be hoped that sooner, rather than later, a marked
change in the attitudes of these nations will occur to bring about an improvement of the present situation.

